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THE TARKANIAN DECISION: THE STATE OF COLLEGE
ATHLETICS IS EVERYTHING BUT STATE ACTION
Kevin M. McKenna*
INTRODUCTION
Having gone to the Final Four twice before, University of Nevada Las
Vegas ("UNLV")' Coach Jerry Tarkanian2 took his case to the final nine as
his twelve-year legal battle against the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion ("NCAA") s moved from the basketball court to the United States Su-
* B.A., 1983, Villanova University; J.D., 1986, Villanova University School of Law. Former
law clerk for the Honorable Randy J. Holland of the Supreme Court of Delaware and the former
Chief Assistant City Solicitor for Philadelphia. Currently an Associate with the law firm of
Kleinbard, Bell & Brecker in Philadelphia. The author was a member of the Villanova basketball
team from 1979-1983. Publications include Age Limitations and the NCAA: Discrimination or
Equating Competition?, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 379 (1987), and A Proposition with a Powerful
Punch: The Legality and Constitutionality of N.C.A.A. Proposition 48, 26 DuQ. L. REV. 43
(1987). He is also the co-author of Brock & McKenna, Drug Testing in Sports, 92 DICK. L. REv.
505 (1988). The author would like to thank Vickie Lynne Knox for her assistance in preparing the
manuscript. The author is also grateful to Charles J. Bloom, Esq. and James A. Infortuna, for
their editorial comments.
1. UNLV is a public university existing by virtue of article 11, § 4 of the Nevada Constitution.
Tarkanian v. NCAA ("Tarkanian I"), 103 Nev. 331, 333, 741 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1987), rev'd,
488 U.S. 179 (1988); see also NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 4 (providing that "[t]he Legislature shall
provide for the establishment of a State University which shall embrace departments for Agricul-
ture, Mechanic Arts, and Mining to be controlled by a Board of Regents whose duties shall be
prescribed by Law").
2. Jerry Tarkanian has been a head basketball coach for nearly 30 years. Tarkanian II, 103
Nev. at 333, 741 P.2d at 1346. He has coached at UNLV since 1973. Id.
3. The district court briefly summarized the purpose of the NCAA:
[The NCAA] is a private non-profit association organized in 1905. [The] NCAA
consists of approximately 900 members. Membership is open to four-year institutions
which meet certain academic standards. Allied and Associate membership is open to
athletic conferences....
... [The] NCAA operates pursuant to a Constitution and Bylaws adopted by the
membership and subject to amendment .... The general policies of [the] NCAA are
established by the membership at annual conventions. When the annual convention is
not in session, policy is established and directed by the NCAA Council of 22 mem-
bers elected by the entire membership at the annual convention. [The] NCAA has a
professional staff located at its headquarters in Shawnee Mission, Kansas. Some 80
employees execute NCAA policy under the supervision of [an executive director].
Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (W.D. Okla. 1982), afl'd in part, remanded
in part, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir.), stay granted, 463 U.S. 1311 (1983), affd, 468 U.S. 85
(1984). The NCAA's constitution, bylaws, and procedures are set forth at length in its manual,
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1990-91 NCAA MANUAL [hereinafter NCAA
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preme Court.' Before the country's highest court, Tarkanian argued that the
NCAA violated his due process rights during a 1976 NCAA investigation of
rule violations at UNLV.5 On the other side of the court was the NCAA,.
arguing that as a private, voluntary association, consisting of approximately
960 public and private education institutions, it had no obligation to comply
with procedural safeguards when it ordered the university to suspend
Tarkanian from coaching for two years. 6 In this case of first impression,7 the
Court held in a 5-4 decision that the NCAA's participation in events leading
up to the suspension of Jerry Tarkanian did not violate his fourteenth amend-
ment rights.8
After a two-and-one-half year investigation of UNLV's basketball program,
the NCAA Committee on Infractions9 issued an official inquiry to UNLV in
late February of 1976.0 The official inquiry outlined seventy-eight rule viola-
tions which allegedly occurred between 1970 and 1976.11 The Committee re-
quested UNLV to conduct its own investigation and respond within three
months. 2 At the behest of UNLV, the Nevada State Attorney General's Of-
fice conducted an extensive investigation of the allegations.1 "
UNLV submitted a response to the Committee on Infractions denying that
a violation had occurred.1 ' The Committee on Infractions reviewed the allega-
tions during approximately three days of hearings.15 The Committee found
that thirty-eight of the seventy-eight allegations were actual violations of
NCAA rules. 6 Tarkanian was specifically named in ten violations.17 The
MANUAL]. The NCAA Council is elected at annual conventions and has sole responsibility for
implementing and interpreting NCAA policies. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. 331, 333, 741 P.2d 1345,
1346 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
4. NCAA v. Tarkanian ("Tarkanian III"), 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
5. Id. at 181.
6. Id. at 183.
7. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Tarkanian III, the Court had never been faced with
the question of whether the NCAA was a state actor such that its actions were subject to the due
process restrictions of the fourteenth amendment. Comment, Constitutional Law-Due Pro-
cess-National Collegiate Athletic Association Is Not Considered a State Actor Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 519, 522 (1990).
8. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. at 182.
9. Id. The NCAA Committee on Infractions administers the NCAA enforcement program.
Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Originally, the official inquiry was 54 pages long, outlining 72 rule violations. Id. It was
later supplemented with six additional allegations. Id.
12. Id. at 334, 741 P.2d at 1346.
13. Id.
14. Id. In denying any violations of NCAA rules, UNLV submitted two boxes of sworn state-
ments, affidavits, and other documentary evidence to refute the NCAA allegations. Id.
15. Id. at 334, 741 P.2d at 1347. NCAA evidence of rule violations consisted solely of its
investigator's oral recollection of interviews with sources. Id. The investigation relied on memo-
randa of the interviews, which were dictated after the interviews. Id. The interviewer never
checked the accuracy of the memoranda. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. UNLV affidavits and sworn statements directly controverted the testimony of the
460 [Vol. 40:459
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Committee issued its findings in a confidential report which directed UNLV to
show cause why additional penalties should not be imposed against the univer-
sity if it did not suspend Tarkanian from involvement with the university's
intercollegiate athletic program for two years. 18 In short, UNLV had a choice:
fire their basketball coach or face sanctions by the NCAA.
After an unsuccessful appeal of the NCAA's ruling, UNLV's president ac-
cepted the hearing officer's recommendation. 19 In September, 1977, UNLV
suspended Tarkanian, noting "the University is simply left without
alternatives. 20
Tarkanian chose to go outside the NCAA process and appeal his case in the
courts. The coach and his future at UNLV were no longer center court.'Now,
if the very existence of the NCAA was not being threatened, certainly its
investigation and enforcement methods were being questioned.
After twelve years of litigation, the United States Supreme Court put the
question to rest. In NCAA v. Tarkanian,2 1 the Court held that Tarkanian was
not entitled to due process during the NCAA investigation which led to his
eventual suspension.2 2 The basis for the Court's ruling was that the NCAA is
not a state actor and, therefore, its actions are not subject to fourteenth
amendment due process requirements.2 1
The Tarkanian decision is a definitive answer to a long debated question:
whether the NCAA is a state actor, thereby bringing its actions within the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Lower courts had wrestled with
this question for well over a decade.2 ' In upholding the NCAA's status as a
private actor, the Court affirmed the NCAA's broad regulatory power, while
taking away the individual's constitutional protections.
This Article will begin with a survey of Supreme Court and lower court
decisions which have questioned whether the fourteenth amendment applies to
institutional actions in the context of civil rights claims brought under section
19832" and the fourteenth amendment. 2 Next, the Nevada Supreme Court
decision in the Tarkanian litigation will be discussed to provide a background
to the United States Supreme Court decision. Following the Nevada decisions
NCAA enforcement staff with respect to the allegations against Tarkanian. Id.
18. Id. The Committee issued its findings in Confidential Report No. 123(47). Id.
19. Id.
20. University of Nevada v. Tarkanian ("Tarkanian I"), 95 Nev. 389, 393, 594 P.2d 1159,
1162 (1979), later proceeding, 103 Nev. 331, 333, 741 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S.
179 (1988).
21. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
22. Id. at 181-82.
23. Id. at 199.
24. See infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
26. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. Section 1983 and the fourteenth amendment are the two most
often employed means of attacking the NCAA's authority. Note, National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Tarkanian: Supreme Court Upholds NCAA's Private Status Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Repelling Shark's Attack on NCAA's Disciplinary Powers, 17 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
217, 222 (1989).
1991]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
is an analysis of the Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions. Fi-
nally, this Article argues that the Court's analysis is misguided in emphasizing
the adversarial nature of the relationship between UNLV and the NCAA dur-
ing the Tarkanian investigation. The Court should have considered, instead,
the practical effect of the NCAA's investigation and subsequent recommenda-
tions to suspend Jerry Tarkanian. The Article concludes with a discussion of
the practical impact of the Tarkanian decision and how some state legislatures
have responded.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND THE NCAA BYLAWS
Given the number of coaches and athletes who are sidelined by NCAA by-
laws, it is surprising that more of them do not challenge the legality of the
applicable bylaws in a court of law. 7 More than just a coach's job is at stake
when the NCAA investigates a school's sports program for alleged violations.
In reality, a university's athletic program is likely to be one of its most signifi-
cant sources of funds.28
Upon further examination, however, it becomes evident that lawsuits chal-
lenging the legality of any NCAA bylaw are difficult to win.29 Under the most
typical scenario, any athlete or coach declared ineligible or suspended by an
NCAA proceeding challenges the action as violative of their fourteenth
amendment rights 0 by way of a civil rights claim brought under section
1983."1
27. However, it has been suggested that as many as 15% of all NCAA sports programs are
involved in some type of illegal activity at any given moment. Note, supra note 26, at 219 n.12
(referring to statement by David Berst, the NCAA's Director of Enforcement) (citation omitted).
28. The amount of money involved is staggering. In 1983, the 52 schools participating in the
NCAA basketball tournament were each awarded $120,000. Comment, NCAA Eligibility Regu-
lations and the Fourteenth Amendment-Where Is the State Action?, 13 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 433,
435 (1986). Those schools that were fortunate enough to continue on to the final 16 were re-
warded with a $290,000 check. Id. Those teams fortunate enough to go all the way to the coveted
"Final Four" received $520,000. Id.
It is estimated that more than 25 million people watched the 1988-89 NCAA basketball tourna-
ment. Gup, Foul!, TIME, Apr. 3, 1989, at 54. Due to the continued expansion of television viewers,
the pot continues to grow. By 1988, the tournament had gross receipts of over $68.2 million. Id. In
1988, the four teams that made it to the "Final Four" each received $1.2 million. Id.
29. For other analyses of lawsuits challenging regulations of the NCAA, see McKenna, Age
Limitations and the NCAA: Discrimination or Equating Competition?, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 379,
384-86 (1987); McKenna, A Proposition with a Powerful Punch: The Legality and Constitution-
ality of NCAA Proposition 48, 26 Duo. L. REV. 43 (1987).
30. The fourteenth amendment reads, in pertinent part:
• . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CO ST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. The text of § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
[Vol. 40:459
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The NCAA enforcement process can be divided into two main
phases-investigation and adjudication."2 The NCAA enforcement staff over-
sees the investigation aspects, and the Committee on Infractions is responsible
for the adjudication and penalty-fixing stage.3 Tarkanian challenged both
phases of the NCAA enforcement process under the premise that the NCAA
failed to afford him the basic tenets of due process.34 Before Tarkanian would
have a chance to contend that his civil rights had indeed been violated, how-
ever, the coach first had to hurdle the threshold question of whether "state
action" existed.35
A successful section 1983 claim must allege that the deprivation of the con-
stitutional right is attributable to the state or a governmental agent.36 This is
known as the state action requirement.37 A purely private action, for example,
cannot violate the equal protection or due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment unless the private action is done under color of law."s The inquiry
for determining whether state action exists is virtually identical for evaluating
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
The Supreme Court has recognized the close relationship between § 1983 and the fourteenth
amendment. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (recognizing that a purpose of § 1983
is to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment).
The distinction between the state action requirement of § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment
has been described as merely semantic, having no substantive consequences. Parish v. NCAA, 506
F.2d 1028, 1031 n.6 (5th Cir. 1975). The "under color of state law" requirement of § 1983 is said
to reflect merely the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. Id.; see also Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982) ("If the challenged conduct of respondents consti-
tutes state action as delimited by our prior decisions, then that conduct was also action under
color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983.") (footnote omitted).
32. F. Remington, NCAA Rule Enforcement Procedures, in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL & AMA-
TEUR SPORTS 12-2 (G. Uberstine ed. 1988).
33. Id. At the outset, the NCAA staff determines what investigative methods will be employed,
when to issue an official inquiry, and how best to facilitate the investigation in conjunction with
counsel for the institution and the coach. Id. During the second stage, the Committee on Infrac-
tions, after hearing the evidence, decides whether any violations occurred. Id. If violations are
found, the Committee determines the appropriate penalty and argues possible appeals. Id.
34. Tarkanian I, 95 Nev. 389, 394, 594 P.2d 1159, 1162 (1979), later proceeding, 103 Nev.
331, 333, 741 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
35. See Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. 331, 335-37, 741 P.2d 1345, 1347-49 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S.
179 (1988). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497-99
(2d ed. 1983) (discussing the central theory behind the state action requirement).
36. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) ("The ultimate issue in deter-
mining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising
under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights 'fairly attributable
to the State?' ") (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
37. E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.3, at 380 (1989).
38. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978) ("Although a private person may
cause a deprivation of such a right, he may be subjected to liability under § 1983 only when he
does so under color of law.").
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whether an individual is acting under "color of law."' 9 Consequently, for a
successful action against the NCAA under section 1983, a plaintiff must ini-
tially surmount a difficult jurisdictional barrier. The litigant must establish
that the actions of the NCAA were taken under color of state law within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.40
The state action requirement draws a line between "private" and "public"
conduct.4 1 "Private" conduct is beyond the reach of constitutional restraint,
whereas "public" conduct must meet the requirements of the Constitution.'
2
"Public" conduct is the clearer of the two; when a governmental entity adopts
rules pursuant to its own procedures and implements them without private
involvement, there is clearly state action."3
On the other hand, when a private entity acts, the line of demarcation be-
comes less clear. In that instance, the existence of state action ultimately de-
pends upon whether the circumstances fit one of several rationales for the ap-
plication of constitutional restraint to private entities.'4 The considerations
involved in determining whether a private institution's actions constitute state
action include the following: (1) whether the private entity assumed a "public
function";"5 (2) whether a "symbiotic relationship" or "nexus" exists between
the private organization and the state that subjects the private action to the
same restraints as the government; 46 and (3) whether the impact of the private
entity's activity upon an individual's rights is so significant that restraint is
necessary in order to preserve those rights.' 7
For many years, most of the courts considering the state action issue have
held that actions by the NCAA constitute state action and are subject to the
limitations of the fourteenth amendment. For instance, in Buckton v. NCAA,'
8
39. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1981) (stating that the statutory mandate
of action "under color of state law" and the "state action" prerequisite for invoking the fourteenth
amendment are identical for purposes of a § 1983 action brought against a state official).
40. Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 1975).
41. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 35, at 497-513 (discussing the distinction
between "private" and "public" conduct as it relates to state action).
42. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (reiterating the "essential
dichotomy" set forth in the fourteenth amendment between a deprivation by the state which is
subject to scrutiny and private conduct "against which the fourteenth amendment offers no
shield").
43. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 35, at 497.
44. Id. at 497-99.
45. See. e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (explaining that
state action is present "in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively re-
served to the state" and hence constitutes a "public function").
46. See id. at 351 (["T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be
fairly treated as that of the state itself.").
47. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that enforcement of private agree-
ments to exclude persons on the basis of race violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment).
48. 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973) (granting college hockey players, who were Canadian
nationals, an injunction against the NCAA from declaring the players ineligible for intercollegiate
[Vol. 40:459
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the district court found a substantial likelihood that challenged NCAA sanc-
tions constituted state action, and thus the court enjoined enforcement of
NCAA eligibility rules.' 9 The court was impressed with the fact that the
NCAA performed public functions and noted several factors which indicated
the presence of state action." Namely, the court was persuaded by the fact
that approximately one-half of the NCAA's membership was comprised of
state universities, that these public institutions pay dues to the NCAA, and
that state involvement in the NCAA includes the use of state facilities for
NCAA contests.51
The Ninth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to find that
NCAA sanctions involved state action in Associated Students, Inc. v.
NCAA. 52 Less than a year later, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia followed suit in Howard University v. NCAA.5 In Howard University,
the court considered the size, influence, and wealth of the NCAA as important
factors indicating state action.5' The court concluded that private institutions
complying with the policies of the NCAA engage in the requisite degree of
state action to subject the NCAA to the fourteenth amendment. 55
Finally, in Parish v. NCAA, 56 the Fifth Circuit concluded that state action
existed where the NCAA declared five players ineligible to compete in
NCAA-sponsored tournaments under its 2.00 rule.5 The players sought an
sports due to their earlier participation in Canadian junior amateur hockey leagues).
49. Id. at 1156.
50. Id. at 1156-57.
51. Id. at 1157.
52. 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974). In Associated Students, a students' organization of Califor-
nia State University and individual students alleged that the NCAA's 1.600 grade point average
requirement ("1.600 Rule") resulted in an unreasonable classification in violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 1252. The Ninth Circuit referred to the
district court's decision in Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1220, 1225 (W.D. La. 1973), affd, 506
F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975), and held that the NCAA's enforcement activities were "state action."
Associated Students. 493 F.2d at 1254. Nonetheless, the court also found that the rule's classifi-
cation was reasonably related to the purposes for which it had been enacted. Id. at 1255. Accord-
ing to evidence offered by the NCAA, the rule was adopted to reduce the possibility of exploiting
young athletes by recruiting those who would not be representative of the student body and who
probably would not graduate. Id.
53. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
54. Id. at 219-20.
55. Id. at 220.
56. 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975). In Parish, the NCAA's 1.600 Rule was challenged once
again, this time by five college basketball players who played for a small private school in Shreve-
port, Louisiana, known as Centenary College. Id. at 1030. Interestingly, one of the appellants,
Robert Parish, later starred on the Boston Celtics of the National Basketball Association. The
Fifth Circuit upheld the rule because it passed constitutional muster under the traditional "mini-
mum rationality" standard. Id. at 1034.
The Supreme Court has defined "minimum rationality" to mean that "the classification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike." F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
57. The NCAA repealed the 1.600 Rule and replaced it with the 2.00 Rule. Parish, 506 F.2d
1991]
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injunction to prevent the NCAA from enforcing its ruling. 8 While the court
denied the requested relief, the appellate court nonetheless held that the activi-
ties of the NCAA constituted action taken under color of state law. 59
Initially, the decisions in Howard University, Associated Students, and Par-
ish were considered solid precedent. For instance, the First Circuit relied heav-
ily on these three cases involving the NCAA and found governmental action in
Rivas Tenorio v. Liga Atletica Interuniversitaria.6 0 The Rivas court found
that the NCAA's actions, at issue in the earlier Howard University line of
cases, were analogous to those before the court." The addition of the Rivas
Tenoria decision only strengthened the foundation for finding state action, a
fact reflected when the Eight Circuit cited with approval all four cases in Re-
gents of University of Minnesota v. NCAA.6"
However, a trilogy of Supreme Court cases, all decided on June 25, 1982,
narrowed the reach of the state action doctrine.63 After this date, lower courts
began to reverse the trend toward finding the NCAA to be a public actor.
In Blum v. Yaretsky,14 the Court decided that a private nursing home's
discharge or transfer of Medicaid patients did not satisfy the state action re-
quirement of the fourteenth amendment.65 The Court held that the patients
failed to establish "state action" in the facility-initiated discharges and trans-
fers to lower levels of care, and thus, failed to prove a violation of their four-
teenth amendment rights.66 The Blum Court reviewed its prior state action
at 1030 n.l. The new rule is more demanding in that it requires an entering college freshman to
have acquired an overall grade point average of 2.00 in high school to be eligible to participate in
collegiate sports. Id.
58. Id. at 1031.
59. Id. at 1032. The court concluded that the NCAA, by taking upon itself the role of coordi-
nator and overseer of college athletics, performs a "traditional governmental function." Id. at
1032-33.
60. 554 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1977); see infra note 101.
61. The Rivas court concluded that the differences between the NCAA and the Liga Athletic
Association were inconsequential and, therefore, the activities at issue were within the ambit of
commonwealth action. Id. at 495. Specifically, the court enumerated five factors: (1) the large
number of schools participating in the NCAA which are state or federally supported; (2) the fact
that public institutions provide a vast majority of the NCAA's funds; (3) the large degree of
influence state-supported institutions exerted in fabricating NCAA policy; (4) the large amount of
supervisory power the NCAA exercised over its member's athletic programs; and, finally, (5) the
fact that the NCAA was the sole negotiator of television contracts on behalf of its members, the
proceeds of which, $13,000,000 annually, flow directly back to the participating public schools. Id.
(citing Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
62. 560 F.2d 352, 364-65 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977). Regents of Univ. of
Minn. involved a challenge to the NCAA act of placing the university's athletic teams on indefi-
nite probation for refusing to find three Minnesota student athletes ineligible. Id. at 354.
63. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
64. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
65. Id. at 998. The respondents, representing a class of medical patients, challenged the dis-
charge and transfer decisions of the nursing homes in which they resided, on the grounds that they
were denied notice or an opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 993.
66. Id. at 1012. In short, the court found that the extensive governmental funding and regula-
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decisions and articulated three principles for analyzing the presence of state
action. First, the Court stated:
[t]he mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by
itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes for the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . . The complaining party must also show that 'there is a
sufficiently close nexus' between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that
of the State itself. 
7
Second, a state will not normally be held responsible for a private decision
unless it has "exercised coercive power" or significantly encouraged the deci-
sion, either overtly or covertly, such that the decision must be deemed to be
that of the state.68 "Mere approval of or acquiescence in" the private decision
will not be sufficient to hold the state responsible.6 9 Third, the required nexus
between the state and the regulated entity "may be present if the private en-
tity has exercised powers that are 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
state.' "70
On the same day that the Court decided Blum, the Court held, in Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn," that a private school, which was substantially supported
through state funds and regulated by public authorities, did not act under
color of law in discharging certain employees.72 Consequently, the school was
not subject to liability for alleged constitutional violations under section
1983.11 The Court compared the private school setting to the Medicaid-funded
nursing homes at issue in Blum v. Yaretsky" and held that the school's depen-
dence on public funds did not convert the discharge decisions into acts of the
state. 5 The Court also analogized the school to many private corporations
whose business is largely dependent on government contracts. 6 The Court rea-
soned that acts by such private entities do not become attributable to the gov-
tion of nursing homes did not make the transfer decisions "state action." Id. at 1005-12.
67. Id. at 1004 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 354, 351 (1974)).
68. Id. (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972);
and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970)).
69. Id. The Court went on to explain that "the purpose of this requirement is to assure that
constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the state is responsible for the
specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains." Id. (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 1005 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
71. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
72. Id. at 840. In Rendell-Baker, petitioners, a former vocational counselor and five teachers,
were employed at a privately operated school for high school students with behavioral or substance
abuse problems. Id. at 832. The petitioners brought separate actions in district court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that they had been discharged in violation of their first, fifth, and four-
teenth amendment rights. Id. at 834-35. Public funds accounted for 90% of the school's operating
budget, and the school had to meet certain state regulations to receive the funds. Id. at 832-33.
73. Id. at 843.
74. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
75. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840.
76. Id. at 840-841.
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ernment merely because they receive significant or even total financial support
from the state. 7 Ultimately, the Court held that the petitioners failed to state
a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since the discharge decisions were
not made under color of state law.
7 8
The Court further refined the boundaries of when private actions may con-
stitute state action in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 79 In Lugar, the plaintiff
succeeded in a section 1983 action against a private party. 80 The plaintiff al-
leged that the state had acted jointly with the defendants in depriving him of
property without due process of law through an ex parte attachment proceed-
ing executed pursuant to state law. 81 The Supreme Court stated that the statu-
tory scheme was the product of state action, and a private party's joint partici-
pation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property was sufficient to
characterize that party as a state actor for purposes of the fourteenth amend-
ment.82 The Lugar Court developed a two-part test to determine when such
action may be deemed state action, thereby allowing suit under section 1983.83
This two-part test requires:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privi-
lege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by
a person for whom the State is responsible .... Second, the party charged
with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state
actor. 84
Applying this test, the Court held that the joint participation on the part of
state officials and a private party in appropriating the plaintiff's property con-
77. Id. at 841. Furthermore, the Court recognized that the decisions to discharge the petition-
ers were not mandated or even motivated by any state regulation, unlike the extensive regulation
evidenced in Blum. Id.
The Court was similarly unpersuaded by the argument that the school performs a "public func-
tion." Id. at 842. The Court framed the issue as whether the function performed by the private
entity is "'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State,'" not simply whether a private
organization is serving some public function. Id. (emphasis in the original) (quoting Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
Finally, the Court did not find a "symbiotic relationship" between the school and the state. Id.
at 842-43. Unlike the case of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the state
did not profit from the school's allegedly discriminatory conduct. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830, 842-43 (1982).
78. Id. at 843.
79. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
80. Id. at 925-42.
81. Id. at 942. The controversy in Lugar began when the respondents filed suit in Virginia state
court on a debt owed by petitioner and sought prejudgment attachment of certain property be-
longing to petitioner. Id. at 924. An ex parte writ of attachment was issued and executed by the
sheriff. Id. Thirty-four days later, the trial judge dismissed the attachment for respondent's failure
to establish the statutory grounds for attachment. Id. at 925. Petitioner then brought a § 1983
claim in the federal district court alleging that, in attaching his property, respondents had acted
jointly with the state to deprive him of his property without due process of law. Id.
82. Id. at 941-42.
83. Id. at 937.
84. Id. (citations omitted).
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stituted action under color of state law.8"
Some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court's narrowing of "state
action" under section 1983 would not foreclose the application of the state
action principle to the NCAA.86 For instance, Professor Greene has argued
that the recent state action trilogy of Blum, Rendell-Baker, and Lugar could
be distinguished from the earlier NCAA decisions on the facts alone.8" Profes-
sor Greene further states that "if the state explicitly approves the rules com-
plained of and cooperated in their implementation, then sufficient state action
may exist to impose constitutional restraint."' 8
It is against this background that appellate courts sought to determine
whether NCAA actions fell within the new boundaries of "state action." 89 In
applying the Supreme Court decisions involving state action to the NCAA, the
courts of appeals reached different results. In Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 90 the
Fourth Circuit held that adoption of NCAA bylaws under which a college
tennis player was declared ineligible to play in NCAA tournaments did not
involve "state action."8 1 The Arlosoroff court noted that although the
85. Id. at 942.
86. See Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or Racism?, 28 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 101, 123-27 (1984).
87. Id. at 125. Professor Greene stated:
The Court's recent decisions involved the application of the state action doctrine to
varied fact situations: (1) to a private school that was both state regulated and
funded; (2) to a private nursing home that was both state regulated and funded; and
(3) to a corporation that utilized state law attachment procedures to seize property
for the payment of an overdue debt. None of the recent decisions was unanimous. A
careful reading of the various majority, plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions
merely reinforces the view that findings of state action are likely to be based on fac-
tual idiosyncrasies rather than clear principles.
Id. at 125 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ("factual setting of each case will
be significant")) (other citations omitted).
88. Id. (footnote omitted). Professor Greene suggested that this principle seemed responsible
for the finding of state action in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), and for the
absence of it in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830 (1982). Greene, supra note 86, at 125 n.122.
89. In finding state action with regard to NCAA action, most courts have based their decisions
on the state support received by the public universities of the NCAA. See Spath v. NCAA, 728
F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1984); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (9th
Cir. 1974) (quoting Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (W.D. La. 1973)). Thus, if the
decision in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (finding that mere receipt of public funding
does not constitute state action) is extended to cases involving the NCAA, then any state action
argument will have to-be similar to those theories accepted in Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028,
1032-33 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that the NCAA performs a traditional public function); see also
Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 216-20 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding state action based on
the size, wealth, and influence of NCAA).
90. 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
91. Id. at 1021-22. Arlosoroff was an Israeli citizen. Id. at 1020. After his discharge from the
Israeli Army in March of 1979 at age 22, he participated in 17 amateur tennis tournaments. Id.
He was also a member of the Israeli Davis Cup team. Id. In August of 1981, Arlosoroff enrolled
at Duke University. Id. During his freshman year, Arlosoroff became the team's number one
singles player while leading the Blue Devils to the Atlantic Coast Conference championship. Id.
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NCAA's function of regulating intercollegiate athletics may involve some pub-
lic service, this alone was insufficient to find the existence of state action.9
Similarly, the court stated that it was not enough that an institution was subsi-
dized and highly regulated by the state." According to the court, "If the state
in its regulatory or subsidizing function does not order or cause the action
complained of, and the function is not one traditionally reserved to the state,
then there is no state action." 9' In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit
found that the notion of state action fostered in Howard Univiversity" and
Parish6 had been rejected by the Supreme Court in Rendell-Baker" and
Blum."
In Spath v. NCAA, 99 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit chose not to pursue the question of whether "state action" existed. 100 In-
stead, the court noted that while the weight of authority would support the
plaintiff's position that the NCAA is sufficiently state-connected to incur lia-
bility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,101 "recent trends have limited that concept. 10 2
He was later selected to the All-American Tennis Team. Id. After his freshman year, however,
the NCAA declared him ineligible for further competition on the basis of NCAA bylaws. Id.
92. Id. at 1021. The court explained that there exists no precise formula for determining
whether private conduct constitutes state action. Id. The primary inquiry in each case, the court
noted, is simply "whether the conduct is fairly attributable to the state." Id. (citing Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). The court, in Arlosoroff, noted that none of the
NCAA's functions constituted state action. Id.
93. Id. at 1022. The court noted that there was no suggestion that the representatives of the
state institutions joined together to vote as a block to effect adoption of the bylaw over the objec-
tion of private institutions. Id.
94. Id. The court further stated:
The NCAA serves the common need of member institutions for regulation of athletics
while correlating their diverse interests. Through the representatives of all of the
members[,] Bylaw 5-1-(d)-(3) was adopted, not as a result of governmental compul-
sion, but in the service of the common interests of the members. The adoption of the
Bylaw was private conduct, not state action.
Id.
95. Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
96. Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1220 (W.D. La. 1973), affid, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.
1975).
97. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
98. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). In no uncertain terms, the Arlosoroff court
stated: "Rendell-Baker, Blum and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., not Lugar, control here."
Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1022 (4th Cir. 1984).
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the petitioner alleged that termi-
nation of her electricity constituted state action. Id. at 347-48. The Court noted that it had found
state action where a private entity exercised powers traditionally reserved exclusively to the state.
Id. at 352. Nevertheless, the Court held that Pennsylvania was not sufficiently connected with the
challenged termination of electricity by merely granting the power company a monopoly. Id. at
358. As such, the power company's conduct was not attributable to the state for the purposes of
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 358-59.
99. 728 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1984).
100. See id. at 28.
101. Id. (citing Rivas Tenorio v. Liga Atletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492 (1st Cir.
1977)). In Rivas Tenorio, Colombian citizens brought an action against a Puerto Rican athletic
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The court then skirted the issue by reasoning that since the University of Low-
ell was a "state funded" university, it might be a state actor.1"' The First
Circuit went straight to the particular merits of the case, without definitively
answering the question of whether state action existed. 104
In Butts v. NCAA, 0 5 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit failed to
discuss the issue of "state action." 106 This was particularly surprising since the
Court of Appeals was familiar with, and in fact cited, Professor Greene's
article.107
In Barbay v. NCAA, 1"8 a member of the Louisiana State University
("LSU") football team brought suit against LSU and the NCAA.109 The
plaintiff had been declared ineligible for the January 1, 1987 Sugar Bowl be-
association, contending that they were deprived of equal protection by virtue of one of the associa-
tion's rules. Rivas Tenorio, 554 F.2d at 493. The rule in question prohibited non-Puerto Rican
student-athletes from participating in annual competitions if they entered member institutions
after their 21st birthday. Id. After the district court dismissed the complaint, the First Circuit
reversed, holding that the association's regulations represented action under color of Common-
wealth law. Id. at 496. Therefore, the regulation in question should have been subjected to strict
constitutional scrutiny because the regulation on its face discriminated against aliens. Id. at 497.
102. Spath, 728 F.2d at 28 (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. See id.
105. 751 F.2d 609 (3d Cir. 1984).
106. See id. at 612. Despite the Third Circuit's failure to discuss the issue of state action, the
district court, in an opinion written by Judge Fullam, found the First Circuit's opinion in Spath
very persuasive. See Butts v. NCAA, 600 F. Supp. 73, 74 (E.D. Pa. 1984). Judge Fullam
concluded:
Virtually every contention advanced by plaintiff in this action has been considered,
and firmly rejected, by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Spath v. NCAA, 728
F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1984). In light of this precedent, plaintiff's burden of showing a
likelihood of success on the merits is indeed a heavy one. The First Circuit's opinion is
persuasive, and I have no reason to suppose that the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit would reach a different conclusion.
Id.
Thus, one can assume one of two things. Either Judge Fullam sidestepped the issue as did his
colleagues in the First Circuit, or he believed state action existed. The fact that he reached the
merits of the case only strengthens these two assumptions.
107. In the opinion, Judge Higginbotham quoted at length from Professor Greene's article. See
Butts, 751 F.2d at 612 (quoting Green, supra note 86, at 137). Greene's article seems to represent
the most pragmatic viewpoint. As Green emphasized:
Subjecting the NCAA to the reach of the Constitution would not be inconsistent with
recent Supreme Court decisions. Those decisions have not undermined the principle
that closely intertwined joint ventures between private and public entities must abide
by constitutional principles. Even if the foregoing principle is limited by the tenta-
tively emerging requirement that the state must explicitly approve of private rules and
cooperate in their implementation, it is nonetheless appropriate to subject the NCAA
to the constitutional limitations.
Greene, supra note 86, at 127.
108. No. 86-5697 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 1987) (WESTLAW, Dct database).
109. Id.; see also Neff, Bosworth Faces the Music, SPORTs ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 5, 1987, at 20,
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cause he had tested positive for anabolic steroids. "' Despite conceding that he
had used steroids, Barbay brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, " ' seeking to
enjoin the NCAA and LSU from declaring him ineligible to play in the Sugar
Bowl.112 Barbay did not claim that he would be denied a fundamental right if
he were not allowed to play in that game. " 8 Rather, he claimed that he had a
property right in his reputation and that his reputation would be damaged by
the actions of the NCAA and LSU if he were not permitted to play in the
Sugar Bowl."'
The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Barbay's
section 1983 claims against the NCAA for lack of state action. " Although
the court concluded that.LSU's action constituted state action,116 it dismissed
Barbay's claims against LSU, concluding that Barbay had not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the denial of a chance to play in the Sugar
Bowl would result in his being defamed or that his reputation would be dam-
aged."' The court denied Barbay's requests for equitable relief, finding that
Barbay's inability to display his skills during the 1987 Sugar Bowl to profes-
sional scouts attending that game did not constitute irreparable injury. "
110. Barbay, No. 86-5697 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 1987) (WESTLAW, Dct database).
111. For the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see supra note 31.
112. Barbay, No. 86-5697 (E.D. La. Jan 20, 1987) (WESTLAW, Dct database).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. The court ruled that the NCAA's adoption, implementation, and enforcement of its
drug testing program did not meet § 1983's state action requirement. Id. The court stated:
state regulation or subsidization of an institution will not create a Section 1983 cause
of action without further evidence. There must be a further showing that the state
university caused or procured the adoption of the NCAA regulations in question.
Barbay has never alleged nor sought to prove that LSU caused, directed, or controlled
the implementation of these NCAA regulations.
Id. (citations omitted).
116. Id.
117. Id. But see Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973). In Buckton, the court
stated:
Even the most blas6 and hardened campus observer would recognize the obvious
stigma that attaches to a declaration of athletic ineligibility, particularly when such
ineligibility is based on alleged professionalism, as opposed to more routine academic
insufficiency. A reasonable if not necessary implication would be that plaintiffs lacked
moral fiber because they took money under improper circumstances. Such an implica-
tion would scar their reputations, not only on their own campus but in athletic circles
throughout the county, in a way that no subsequent finding of eligibility would ever
fully erase.
Id. at 1159. The same reasoning uhdoubtedly applies to ineligibility due to drug use.
118. Barbay v. NCAA, No. 86-5697 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 1987) (WESTLAW, Dct database).
The court reasoned that professional scouts do not predicate their "assessments and recommenda-
tions concerning a player solely on the basis of his performance in a post-season competition.
Rather, such scouts normally form their opinions on the basis of regular season games and prac-
tice sessions they have attended, along with game films and interviews." Id. But see Buckton v.
NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1159-60 (D. Mass. 1973) (discussing the issue of irreparable harm).
Moreover, the Buckton court stated, "the players would have only one sophomore year in college
and a later finding in their favor could not restore the precious months that would have been lost
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II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE TARKANIAN LITIGATION
UNLV is a public institution of higher learning funded by the State of Ne-
vada.119 The athletic program at UNLV, like most major institutions of higher
learning,120 is subject to the NCAA's rules and regulations. 2 As a prerequi-
site for membership in the NCAA, all members contractually agree to conduct
their athletic program in conformity with NCAA rules and regulations. 2 The
Committee on Infractions is the NCAA body responsible for administering the
NCAA enforcement program.1 28
to them." Id. at 1159-60. The same reasoning could apply to a missed chance to play in the Sugar
Bowl.
As to the potential harm to the NCAA, the Buckton court stated: "It certainly suffers no harm
to its reputation or authority by not punishing a member institution for obeying a court order." Id.
at 1160. Much of the reasoning in Buckton logically applies in the drug testing context. Barbay
highlights the difficulty amateur athletes, who are not protected by collective bargaining agree-
ments, may face when challenging drug testing programs of nongovernmental entities that are not
restricted by the fourth or fourteenth amendments or by § 1983. Also, the court's almost summary
rejection of Barbay's claim that his property right in his reputation had been damaged suggests a
likely lack of success of similar challenges based on private tort law.
119. Tarkanian I, 95 Nev. 389, 391, 594 P.2d 1159, 1160 (1979), later proceeding, 103 Nev.
331, 333, 741 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
120. The large majority, approximately 960, of all four-year colleges and universities in the
United States having major athletic programs are affiliated with the NCAA. Note, NCAA v.
Tarkanian: The State Action Doctrine Faces a Half-Court Press, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 197, 198
n.6 (1989).
121. See Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179, 183 (1988). The United States Supreme Court noted,
"One of the NCAA's fundamental policies 'is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral
part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body, and by so
doing, retain a clean line of demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.'" Id.
(citation omitted).
122. Tarkanian I, 95 Nev. at 391, 594 P.2d at 1160. The NCAA Constitution provides:
Legislation governing the conduct of intercollegiate athletic programs of member in-
stitutions shall apply to basic athletic issues such as admissions, financial aid, eligibil-
ity, and recruiting; member institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this
legislation, and the enforcement program of the Association shall be applied to an
institution when it fails to fulfill this obligation.
Id. (citation ommitted).
123. Id. Among the sanctions that the Committee may impose against an institution are:
(1) Reprimand and censure;
(2) Probation for one year;
(3) Probation for more than one year;
(4) Ineligibility for one or more National Collegiate Championship events;
(5) Ineligibility for invitational and postseason meets and tournaments;
(6) Ineligibility for any television programs subject to the Association's control or
administration;
(7) Ineligibility of the member to vote or its personnel to serve on committees of the
Association, or both;
(8) Prohibition against an intercollegiate sports team or teams participating against
outside competition for a specified period;
(9) Prohibition against the recruitment of prospective student-athletes for a sport or
sports for a specified period ....
Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. at 183 (citation omitted).
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In late February of 1976, the NCAA Committee on Infractions began en-
forcement proceedings against UNLV by submitting an "official inquiry' 'a14 to
its president, Dr. Baepler.1 25 The official inquiry was the result of a prelimi-
nary investigation conducted by the NCAA over a three-year period,126 and it
included alarming allegations that Tarkanian had purposefully violated
NCAA regulations. 2
In October of 1976, after conducting an independent investigation, UNLV
responded to the NCAA's official inquiry.1 2 The university denied all of the
allegations and concluded that Tarkanian was completely innocent of any
wrongdoing. 2
Four days of hearings followed'" in which the NCAA denied the requests
of UNLV for prior disclosure of the factual bases or sources of the allegations
contained in the letter of inquiry.21 Although Tarkanian was present at all of
the hearings, he was represented by counsel at only the second and third hear-
ings. 12 According to the hearing record, "the charges and allegations against
124. The purpose of an official inquiry is to aid the university in developing a full and indepen-
dent investigation of the information developed by the NCAA staff. Brief for Petitioner at 9,
Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (No. 87-1061).
125. Tarkanian I, 95 Nev. 389, 391-92, 594 P.2d 1159, 1160 (1979), later proceeding, 103
Nev. 331, 333, 741 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179.(1988).
126. Id. During its investigation of UNLV, the Committee on Infractions included three law
professors, a mathematics professor, and the dean of a graduate school. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S.
179, 185 (1988). Four of them were on the faculties of state institutions; one represented a private
university. Id.
127. The most significant violation charged against Tarkanian was that he attempted to impede
the NCAA investigation against him by recruiting people to change their story or fabricate coun-
tervailing evidence, Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. at 186 n.9.
128. Id. at 185. UNLV enlisted the aid of the Attorney General of the State of Nevada and
private counsel to conduct a "cooperative investigation" upon receipt of the letter of inquiry. Id.
129. Id. The record contains the following description of the nature of these proceedings by an
NCAA official:
Once the institution has collected all available information, it then meets with the
Committee on Infractions to discuss the information which it has obtained and previ-
ously submitted to the Committee in writing. The purpose of this hearing before the
Committee on Infractions is for both the institution and the NCAA investigative staff,
for the first time, to present specific information to the Committee concerning alleged
violations of NCAA legislation. This procedure provides an adequate opportunity for
the institutional representatives to debate any of the information presented to the
Committee by the investigative staff or the institution, and to be advised of the source
of the information upon which each allegation is based. Both the Committee on In-
fractions and the University will be informed at the hearing of the identity of the
source of evidence upon which an allegation is based as well as any actual details or
evidence reported by individuals interviewed.
Tarkanian I, 95 Nev. at 391-92, 594 P.2d at 1160.
130. Id. at 391, 594 P.2d at 1160. "Hearings before the Committee on Infractions were con-
ducted on November 14, 1976; December 13, and 14, 1976; and March 13, 1977." Id.
131. Id. at 392, 594 P.2d at 1161.
132. Id. "Shortly before the first hearing was scheduled, the NCAA notified the university that
it had changed its prior position and would allow counsel representing university employees named
in the allegations to be present." Id.
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Jerry Tarkanian were presented by the sole means of having either of two
NCAA staff investigators ... orally relate what each of them recalled of con-
versations he purportedly had with certain individuals concerning their knowl-
edge of purported violations of NCAA legislation by Jerry Tarkanian.' ' 3 The
witnesses who reported information to the NCAA investigators were not pre-
sent to give testimony or to be cross-examined.1 34 Although the NCAA re-
corded the proceedings,"3 5 the tapes were not later transcribed by the
NCAA. 136
In April of 1977, the Committee on Infractions issued a confidential report
containing the Committee's findings of violations of NCAA regulations. The
report recommended imposing penalties on UNLV for such violations.137
Among the Committee's findings was the charge that Tarkanian had influ-
enced individuals testifying in the infractions investigation in an attempt to
frustrate the investigation.' 8 The report included an order directing UNLV to
either take disciplinary action against Tarkanian or to show cause why addi-
tional penalties should not be imposed if it failed to take action.139 The confi-
dential report concluded by drawing the university's attention to the "responsi-
bilities of the institution" under NCAA legislation "to provide due notice and
hearing to the involved individual before taking any disciplinary or corrective
action.' 40
In its appeal to the NCAA Council, UNLV criticized the procedures em-
ployed by the NCAA." The university challenged the basis of twenty-seven
reported violations uncovered by the Committee." 2 Specifically, UNLV dis-
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. No other reporting was allowed. Id.
136. Id. However, UNLV attorneys were allowed to travel to Kansas City to listen to them. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Specifically, Tarkanian was allegedly involved in discouraging others from reporting
violations to the NCAA or to cause them to give untruthful information to the university's investi-
gators. Id. At a university hearing for Tarkanian, UNLV's vice president stated:
Most serious is the charge that Coach Tarkanian attempted to frustrate the NCAA's
application of the rules by getting people to 'change their story' or to fabricate bodies
of countervailing evidence. I am not convinced that the NCAA investigation ade-
quately supports this charge and yet we must remember that the NCAA Infractions
Committee and the NCAA Council, both composed of distinguished scholars, admin-
istrators, and lawyers, believed otherwise.
Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179, 186 n.9 (1988) (citation omitted).
139. Tarkanian I, 95 Nev. 389, 392, 594 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1979), later proceeding, 103 Nev.
331, 333, 741 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). Under the Committee's view,
such disciplinary action meant that Tarkanian must sever all of his relations, formal or informal,
with the university's intercollegiate athletic program during the university's probation, "including,
but not limited to, activities associated with administration, supervision, coaching, recruiting, ath-
letic booster groups, and public relations or fund-raising activities related to the University's ath-
letic program." Id. at 392-93, 594 P.2d at 1161.
140. Id. at 393, 594 P.2d at 1161.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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puted all twenty allegations that directly or indirectly involved Tarkanian,
based on evidence obtained through the independent investigation ordered by
the university. 4" The university questioned the credibility of the NCAA inves-
tigators who had provided information to the Committee on Infractions .1 4
Tarkanian and UNLV were allowed twenty and thirty minutes, respectively,
to present information to the council.'" However, their efforts were to no
avail. In August of 1977, the NCAA Council accepted the Committee on In-
fractions's findings and the recommended penalties.1 46
In September, UNLV granted Tarkanian a hearing on the charges specified
in the NCAA confidential report.14 7 The university advised Tarkanian of his
rights to counsel, to call witnesses on his behalf, and to be provided with a
transcript of the hearing.'4 8 No witnesses testified for the university concern-
ing the NCAA charges, although the evidence was discussed. 49 In his defense,
Tarkanian argued that the university's independent investigation established
that no violations had occurred. 50 Counsel for the university argued that,
nonetheless, the university was bound by the findings of the NCAA. 1" The
hearing officer agreed with the university.' 52 The written decision stated:
[B]y joining the NCAA we delegated to that organization the establishment
of governing standards and their enforcement as well. We are allowed and
encouraged to make our own investigations, but this is in no way a substi-
tute for the investigative functions of the NCAA itself .... We must accept
their findings of fact as in some way superior to our own.'"
Notably, the hearing officer also found that "in this ifistance the NCAA's
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. The hearing was pursuant to notice and was held before an officer appointed by the
university. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. The hearing officer advised President Baepler that the university had three options
with respect to the proposed sanctions:
1. Reject the sanction requiring us to disassociate Coach Tarkanian from the athletic
program and take the risk of still heavier sanctions, e.g., possible extra years of
probation.
2. Recognize the University's delegation to the NCAA of the power to act as ulti-
mate arbiter of these matters, thus reassigning Mr. Tarkanian from his present posi-
tion-though tenured and without adequate notice-even while believing that the
NCAA was wrong.
3. Pull out of the NCAA completely on the grounds that you will not execute what
you hold to be their unjust judgments.
Tarkanian Il1, 488 U.S. 179, 187 (1988). President Baepler adopted the second recommendation.
Id.
153. Tarkanian I, 95 Nev. 389, 393, 594 P.2d 1159, 1162 (1979), later proceeding, 103 Nev.
331, 333, 741 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
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standards of proof and due process were inferior to what we might reasonably
expect. '154 Dr. Baepler followed the hearing officer's recommendation to sus-
pend Coach Tarkanian, noting that "the University is simply left without al-
ternatives." 155 Obviously, Tarkanian was not left without recourse; he chose to
go to court.
A. History of the Litigation
Within two days, Tarkanian filed suit against UNLV, President Baepler,
and the university's regents. 156 Tarkanian sought injunctive relief to restrain
the university from enforcing the NCAA-mandated suspension.157 Addition-
ally, Tarkanian sought a declaration that his procedural and substantive due
process rights were denied.15 8 UNLV's answer highlighted Tarkanian's con-
cern over the NCAA's activities and procedures employed in the investiga-
tion.1" As an affirmative defense, the university also alleged that it was "a
mere extension of the NCAA."' 60 UNLV argued, therefore, that Tarkanian
was "afforded not only the due process hearing provided by the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas, but also prior hearings conducted by the NCAA, all in
compliance with the traditional notions of due process of law. 1 61
At trial, Tarkanian focused upon the detrimental effect the suspension
would have upon his reputation and career. 62 Furthermore, the attorneys who
conducted the independent investigation testified about their problems with the
NCAA staff and procedure. 63 Only one witness, the deputy attorney general
who headed the independent investigation, testified concerning the evidence for
the underlying charges against Tarkanian.'" He testified that his investigation
into the matter had produced no evidence to substantiate the charges.' 65 Nota-
bly, the defense did not present witnesses. 66
The trial court granted Tarkanian injunctive relief. 67 The Nevada Supreme
Court reversed the trial court for Tarkanian's failure to join the NCAA as a
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 394, 594 P.2d at 1162.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. The parties filed an extensive "Stipulation of Facts" before the trial. Id. The vast
majority of these stipulations pertained to the NCAA's structure and procedures. Id. In addition,
correspondence between the university's investigator and the NCAA was filed as exhibits to em-
phasize the problems the university encountered regarding NCAA procedures. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Tarkanian I, 95 Nev. 389, 594 P.2d 1159 (1979), later proceeding, 103 Nev. 331, 741
P.2d 1345 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
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necessary party.168 In July of 1979, Tarkanian filed a second suit, this time
naming both UNLV and the NCAA as defendants.1 69 Tarkanian once again
prevailed in obtaining injunctive relief from the trial court.170
B. Nevada Supreme Court Opinion
1. State Action
On appeal before the Nevada Supreme Court, the NCAA contended that
the penalties it imposed against Tarkanian did not constitute state action. 17 1
The Nevada Supreme Court stated that the well-established requisite of state
action must be present before due process restrictions apply.' 72 The court
noted early decisions which had found NCAA regulatory activities to consti-
tute state action .17  The court explained that the rationale underlying these
cases was the large amount of public funding the institutions enjoyed .1 4 In
holding for Tarkanian, the court was unpersuaded by the NCAA's argument
that the 1982 trilogy of Supreme Court decisions mandated the finding of an
168. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. 331, 333, 741 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1987), rev'd. 488 U.S. 179
(1988).
169. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. 331, 334, 741 P.2d 1345, 1347 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179
(1988).
170. See id. The lower court denied Tarkanian attorney's fees as costs under state law, but did
grant his attorney's fees as costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. The NCAA sought removal to
federal district court on the ground that this was the first time Tarkanian had claimed relief under
§ 1988 and consequently the litigation had changed substantially. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179,
189 (1988). UNLV and the other university defendants declined to join the removal petition,
prompting NCAA to contend that the university defendants should be realigned as plaintiffs be-
cause they actually wanted Tarkanian to prevail. Id. The district court denied the removal petition
and the Ninth Circuit agreed. Id. In the meantime, the Nevada trial court had awarded
Tarkanian almost $196,000 in attorney's fees, 90% of which was to be paid by the NCAA. Id.
The NCAA appealed both the injunction to prevent the enforcement of sanctions and the fee
order. Id. "Not surprisingly, UNLV, which had scored a total victory except for its obligation to
pay a fraction of Tarkanian's fees, did not appeal." Id.
171. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. at 335, 741 P.2d at 1347.
172. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court noted that the under color of law requirement of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 is identical to the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 335
n.1, 741 P.2d at 1347 n.1 (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)). After noting
that the parties had used both "under color" and "state action" synonymously, the court decided
to refer only to state action out of convenience. Id.
173. Id. at 335, 741 P.2d at 1347; see, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352
(8th Cir.) (finding the NCAA's action of placing the University of Minnesota's athletic program
on indefinite probation for refusing to find three student athletes ineligible constituted government
action for purposes of § 1983), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977); Howard Univ. v. NCAA,
510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding that the degree and involvement of NCAA regulation of
public universities' athletic programs sufficiently renders the activities of the NCAA state action);
Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that the activities of the NCAA consti-
tute action taken under color of state law where public universities play a substantial role in the
association); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that
state action exists when the NCAA regulates schools and universities that are publicly supported).
174. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. 331, 335, 741 P.2d 1345, 1348 (1987) (citing Rivas Tenorio v.
Liga Atletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir. 1977)).
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absence of state action."'
In fact, the Nevada Supreme Court relied on the Blum trilogy176 and cases
subsequently interpreting it'77 to support its finding of state action. 78 Accord-
175. Id. at 335-37, 741 P.2d at 1347-49. The Supreme Court cases on which the NCAA relied
were Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922
(1982), and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. at 335, 741 P.2d at
1347.
176. In Blum, the Supreme Court held that Medicaid patients in private nursing homes were
not entitled to due process in challenging the decision of physicians who transferred them to lower
levels of care. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982). The Court noted that such decisions
were made by a private doctor. Id. at 1005. It reasoned, therefore, that the transfer was not the
result of any governmental policy or regulation making it necessary for due process to apply. Id.
The Blum Court stated, "a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only
when it has exercised coercive power or had provided such significant encouragement, either overt
or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Id. at 1004. (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
Relying on its decision in Blum, the Court in Rendell-Baker held that a private high school for
maladjusted students did not act under color of state law when it discharged five teachers and a
guidance counselor. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-42 (1982). The school in question
was governmentally regulated and supported and received most of its students by referral from
public schools. Id. at 840. However, the Court stated that this was insufficient to turn a private
decision into state action. Id.
The Rendell-Baker Court distinguished the situation at hand from the one posed in Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). In Lugar, the Court determined that a private party's
action constituted state action where a creditor jointly participated with state officials in obtaining
and executing an ex parte writ of attachment of petitioner's property. Id. at 942. The Court
interpreted its cases to require "that the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal
right be fairly attributable to the State." Id. at 937. The Lugar decision developed a two-part
approach to determine state action:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege cre-
ated by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for
whom the State is responsible. . . . Second, the party charged with the deprivation
must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he
is a state official, because he acted together with or has obtained significant aid from
state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.
Id.
The Rendell-Baker court distinguished Lugar on the ground that the role of the public officials
in the discharge of the plaintiff was much more limited than the role of the sheriff in Lugar.
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 839 n.6. Specifically, the public officials in Rendell-Baker only had
the authority to review the qualifications of the petitioners; they had no authority to hire or dis-
charge. Id.
177. E.g., Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Graham v. NCAA,
804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that state university's adoption of NCAA rules limiting a
transfer student's ability to participate in intercollegiate athletics is not state action absent a
showing the university directed or controlled the implementation of said rules); Ponce v. Basket-
ball Fed'n of Puerto Rico, 760 F.2d 375 (1st Cir. 1985) (concluding that the considerations set
out in the Blum trilogy precluded a finding of state action where there is no evidence that the
government encouraged or affirmatively induced the conduct); McHale v. Cornell Univ., 620 F.
Supp. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (declining injunctive relief against enforcement of NCAA eligibility
requirements since private university's compliance with NCAA rules does not constitute state ac-
tion absent the requisite level of state-private cooperation).
In Arlosoroff, a Duke University tennis player challenged NCAA eligibility requirements.
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ing to the court, both Blum"'9 and Rendell-Baker 80 determined that state ac-
tion exists when "the private entity has exercised powers that are 'traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the state.' "181 The court stated:
UNLV is a public institution, existing by virtue of Article 11, Section 4 of
the Nevada Constitution. Tarkanian is therefore a public employee. In our
view, the right to discipline public employees is traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the state. UNLV cannot escape responsibility for disciplinary
action against employees by delegating that duty to a private entity.' 8"
Consequently, the Tarkanian court viewed the issue differently than the
Arlosoroff court, which held that "the regulation of intercollegiate athletics is
not a function traditionally reserved exclusively to the state."183 The Nevada
court also noted that the facts of the instant case were distinguishable from
Arlosoroff and other cases cited by the NCAA "in that those cases concerned
private schools." 184 The Nevada Supreme Court also discounted Graham v.
NCAA, 88 upon which the NCAA relied.' 88 The court emphasized the differ-
ent facts under which the Graham case was decided.1 87 Graham, the court
explained, did not concern the enforcement of NCAA rules against a state
Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1020. The Arlosoroff court outlined the two instances in which the
NCAA's conduct would be considered state action. The plaintiff must establish either: (1) that the
NCAA was serving a function traditionally and exclusively within the state's prerogative; or (2)
that the state or its agency caused, controlled, or directed the NCAA's action. Id. at 1022. Exam-
ining the facts, the Arlosoroff court determined that the state action requirement was not met. Id.
The court based its decision on the fact that the plaintiffs could not show that the state schools
joined as a bloc to cause the bylaw in question to be adopted. Id.
178. The Tarkanian II court noted that "Arlosoroff specifically rejected the earlier line of cases
which held that NCAA regulatory activity is state action." Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. 331, 336, 741
P.2d 1345, 1348 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
179. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
180. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
181. Tarkanian 11, 103 Nev. at 336, 741 P.2d at 1348 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1005 (1982) (citation omitted)).
182. Id. at 336-37, 741 P.2d at 1348.
183. See id. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1348-49.
184. Id. 741 P.2d at 1349.
185. 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986). In Graham, two students who transferred from the Univer-
sity of Louisville were prevented from playing football at Western Kentucky University under
NCAA regulations. Id. at 955. The students filed an action against the University of Louisville
and the NCAA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 957. In affirming the lower court's decision, the
Sixth Circuit held that the NCAA regulations which prevented the plaintiffs from participating in
another NCAA football program did not constitute state action. Id. at 957-58. Relying on the
Blum trilogy, the court stated that the latest Supreme Court decisions required a different conclu-
sion than earlier decisions which found NCAA regulations to be state action. Id. at 958. In order
for NCAA conduct to constitute state action, the court held, the plaintiff must establish either
that (1) the NCAA was serving a function traditionally reserved to the state; or (2) the state
either directly or indirectly caused the action. Id. (citing Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019,
1021-22 (4th Cir. 1984)).
186. Tarkanian 11, 103 Nev. 331, 337, 741 P.2d 1345, 1349 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179
(1988).
187. Id.
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employee, unlike the facts in the Tarkanian case.18
Under this reasoning, the Nevada high court found state action present
under the two-part approach developed in Lugar.89 The court stated:
The first prong is met because no third party could impose disciplinary sanc-
tions upon a state university employee unless the third party received the
right or privilege from the university. Thus, the deprivation which
Tarkanian alleges is caused by the exercise of a right or privilege created by
the state. 190
The Nevada Supreme Court found both UNLV and the NCAA to be state
actors.191 The court reasoned that UNLV's cooperation in imposing NCAA
sanctions against Tarkanian implicated the NCAA as a state actor. 92
2. Property or Liberty Interest
The Nevada Supreme Court rejected the NCAA's assertion that
Tarkanian's sanction did not constitute a deprivation of property or liberty
interests." 3 The court found it significant that Tarkanian and UNLV had exe-
cuted, a series of one-year employment contracts since the beginning of their
association. 194 However, his 1977-1978 contract was entitled "Tenured Profes-
sional Employment Document. 1 9 5 This contract, the court determined,
granted Tarkanian tenure status and was binding when UNLV suspended
Tarkanian in September of 1977. 91 In the court's view, Tarkanian's contrac-
tual relationship with UNLV established a property interest in continued
employment. 97
The NCAA unsuccessfully argued before the Nevada court that Tarkanian
was not deprived of a property interest because the suspension affected only
188. Id.
189. Id. For a discussion of the two-part test established in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922 (1982), see supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
190. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1349.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. "The protections of due process attach only to deprivations involving a property or
liberty interest." Id. (citing Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279, 282 (6th Cir. 1976)).
194. Id. at 338, 741 P.2d at 1348.
195. Id. Tarkanian's contract, which was dated June 20, 1977, and went for a term running
from July 1, 1977, through June of 1978, continued an established practice between the parties.
Id.
196. Id. This confirmed Tarkanian's testimony that upon arrival at UNLV he was promised
that tenure would be given at some time in the future. Id.
197. Id. In reaching such a decision, the court relied on Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972). In Roth, the Supreme Court stated that property interests "are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those benefits." Id. Therefore, the Tarkanian II court reasoned that an employment
contract can constitute a property right. Tarkanian II,. 103 Nev. 331, 337, 741 P.2d 1347, 1349
(1987) (citing Stewart v. Bailey, 556 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 1977)).
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his duties as head coach. 198 The court noted that Tarkanian's 1977-1978 em-
ployment contract conferred the dual positions of head basketball coach and
professor of physical education. 199 The NCAA contended that since the sus-
pension had no effect on Tarkanian's position as professor he had not been
deprived of a property interest. 00 The NCAA's argument relied upon prece-
dent holding that employees do not have a property interest in a particular
employment position.201 In rejecting this argument, the court noted the effect
of the suspension on Tarkanian's career.20 2 At the time the sanctions were
imposed, Tarkanian had held a position as head basketball coach for twenty
years, four of these at UNLV.20 1 Therefore, the court reasoned, taking away
his position as head basketball coach would mean a drastic decline in his
prominence. 20 4
The Nevada Supreme Court also found that Tarkanian possessed a liberty
interest protected by the due process clause, as defined by the "stigma-plus"
test enunciated in Paul v. Davis.205 Under the "stigma-plus" test, the
"stigma" is the injury to one's reputation. 208 The "plus" is the decrease in
status as a result of the stigma.2 07 The court ruled against the NCAA in find-
ing that Tarkanian's suspension met both prongs of the test.208 The Nevada
Supreme Court noted that the "stigma-plus" in the employment context must
be severe enough to foreclose an individual's opportunity to seek alternative
employment opportunities. 20 9 According to the court, dismissal from employ-
198. Tarkanian I, 103 Nev. at 338, 741 P.2d at 1349.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Childers v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1341 (10th Cir.
1982); Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279, 282 (6th Cir. 1976)).
202. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. 331, 338 741 P.2d 1345, 1349 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In Paul v. Davis, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 action against the local
chief of police, alleging a deprivation of liberty and property interests without due process of law.
Id. at 696. The police department had circulated a flyer of "active shoplifters" which included the
name and photograph of the plaintiff. Id. at 695. After shoplifting charges against the plaintiff
were dismissed, the plaintiff filed suit in federal court. Id. at 695-96. The Court held that defama-
tion by a state official alone does not implicate the due process clause. Id. at 710. Nor was the
plaintiff extended any guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation, such that due process protec-
tions were required before that interest may be altered or revoked. Id. at 711-12. The Davis Court
stated that the plaintiff must show that a "right or status previously recognized by state law was
distinctly altered or extinguished" injuring his reputation. Id. at 711.
206. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. 331, 338, 741 P.2d 1345, 1350 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179
(1988).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 338-39, 741 P.2d at 1350.
209. Id. at 338, 741 P.2d at 1350 (citing Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240, 1243 (7th Cir.)
(demoting, firing, or otherwise disciplining an employee does not amount to a deprivation of lib-
erty where the individual remains free to pursue alternative employment opportunities), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank, 650 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 1981)
(unpublicized accusations fail to infringe constitutional liberty interests because they cannot harm
an individual's reputation), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982)).
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ment on grounds involving immorality or dishonesty satisfies the stigma prong
of the stigma-plus test.2"' Looking to the circumstances surrounding
Tarkanian's dismissal, the court found that the grounds for the suspension
were sufficient to satisfy this standard.21 a
Similarly, the court also found the "plus" prong was satisfied.21 2 The court
rejected the NCAA's contention that Tarkanian failed to establish he suffered
a sufficient change of status.21 The court concluded that even though
Tarkanian would have retained employment as a professor, the NCAA's disci-
plinary action would have drastically diminished his position. 1 "Absent judi-
cial intervention," the court stated, "Tarkanian's suspension might well have
ended his college coaching career."215
3. Due Process
The NCAA had also contested the trial court's finding that the suspension
failed to afford Tarkanian due process of law. 216 Once again Nevada's highest
court disagreed with the NCAA, 17 stating:
In the hearings before the Committee on Infractions, the NCAA enforce-
ment staff presented orally the NCAA's case. The investigators' presenta-
tion consisted of their recollections of interviews with sources. The investiga-
tors relied upon notes of the interviews, sometimes dictated after the fact.
Tarkanian and UNLV hotly contested virtually all of the testimony which
allegedly established rule violations by Tarkanian, and they presented evi-
dence directly contradicting the investigators' testimony, generally consist-
ing of signed affidavits and statements from persons whom the NCAA had
interviewed. In the circumstances of this case, this procedure does not com-
port with due process requirements. 218
The Nevada Supreme Court recognized the flexibility of procedural due pro-
cess requirements.219 However, the court maintained that three competing in-
terests must be considered in determining the level of process due:
210. Id. at 338-39, 741 P.2d at 1350; see also Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d
361, 366 n.13 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that a stigma so severe that it completely prevents an
individual from practicing in her chosen profession infringes constitutional liberty).
211. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. 331, 339, 741 P.2d 1345, 1350 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179
(1988). The court noted the negative implications brought upon the moral character of Tarkanian
by these allegations. Id. at 339 n.2, 741 P.2d at 1350 n.2. Specifically, the NCAA's findings
against Tarkanian charged that he arranged for a student to get an undeserved grade in a class,
he falsely attested to the compliance by UNLV to the NCAA rules, and that he impeded the
NCAA's investigation of him by encouraging individuals to provide false information. Id.
212. Id. at 339, 741 P.2d at 1350.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail. 210
For support, the Nevada Supreme Court relied on Stanley v. Big Eight
Conference.21 In Stanley, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the Big Eight Confer-
ence, which was working in cooperation with the NCAA, from conducting a
hearing to determine if Oklahoma State University athletic personnel had vio-
lated rules of the conference and the NCAA. 2 1 The Stanley court granted
injunctive relief,223 noting the severe impact on coaching personnel when they
are found to have violated the rules governing their activities. 2 4 Having al-
ready discussed this point in the context of Tarkanian's liberty or property
interest, the Tarkanian court declined to repeat itself, stating: "We only reit-
erate our view that Tarkanian's suspension likely would have ended his near
thirty-year career as a head coach and permanently tarnished his reputation.
He no doubt possessed a significant interest in the outcome of the NCAA
proceedings, an interest which cannot be taken lightly." 22'
The Nevada Supreme Court then examined the fact-finding procedures em-
ployed by the NCAA and compared them to the procedures in Stanley.2"' In
Stanley, the fact-finding body intended to rely upon an investigator's report as
evidence of wrongdoing, even though the report, which detailed interviews
with approximately seventy-five people, was only eighteen pages long.2 27 The
Stanley court found the procedures unconstitutional. 2 28 The Tarkanian court
noted that there were significant similarities between Tarkanian's case and
Stanley.22' Persuaded by the Stanley reasoning, the Nevada court wrote:
220. Id. at 339-40, 741 P.2d at 1350-51 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)).
221. 463 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
222. Id. at 921-22.
223. Id. at 933-34.
224. Id. at 926-27, 930.
225. Tarkanian I, 103 Nev. 331, 340, 741 P.2d 1345, 1351 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179
(1988).
226.. See id.
227. Stanley v. Big Eight Conference, 463 F. Supp. 920, 924 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
228. Id. at 931. The Stanley court stated:
Of greatest concern to the Court is that the author of the investigative report is free
to draw certain inferences beyond those statements of fact made to him in his inter-
views.... Furthermore, the author of the report presents statements made to him in a
fashion that may not necessarily be prejudicial or biased but may certainly be classi-
fied as not completely neutral. It is this unconscious subjective coloring of the state-
ments that troubles the Court. Accurate findings of fact should not be made upon pre-
digested information.
Id.
229. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. at 340-41, 741 P.2d at 1351. For example, Stanley involved a
484
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In these circumstances, basing findings of fact upon pre-digested informa-
tion creates serious due process problems. The lengthy and far-reaching
scope of the NCAA's investigation in this case creates the danger that the
enforcement staff may not remember the precise nature of interviews. This
increases the likelihood that investigators, no matter how pure their inten-
tions, will gloss their testimony with an "unconscious subjective coloring. ' 220
The court also noted that "despite the NCAA's desire to make the investi-
gation a cooperative effort, the proceedings obviously became adversarial. ' 81
Again the court warned that this enhances the likelihood that predigested in-
formation will be presented in a fashion favorable to the investigator-witness'
position. 23
2
The Nevada court pointed out that alternative procedures for protecting
Tarkanian's interest were available. 233 At a minimum, the court wrote, "the
NCAA should be required to produce written affidavits of persons interviewed
by the enforcement staff."2 In summary, the Nevada Supreme Court found
that the NCAA's mandate to UNLV to suspend Tarkanian constituted state
action, depriving Tarkanian of both property and liberty protected by the Con-
stitution, and that he was not afforded due process before the deprivation.23 6
III. NCAA v. TARKANIAN
A. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Nevada Su-
substantial investigation, with 75 people interviewed. Stanley, 463 F. Supp. at 924. The NCAA's
investigation of Tarkanian and UNLV spanned approximately two and one-half years, and re-
sulted in 58 pages of typed material, detailing 78 allegations of infractions. Tarkanian II, 103
Nev. at 340-41, 741 P.2d at 1351. Also, in Stanley, the plaintiff denied the allegations pertaining
to him. Stanley,. 463 F. Supp. at 924. Tarkanian not only denied the allegations, he produced
numerous sworn statements directly contradicting the testimony of the ,NCAA's investigators.
Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. at 341, 741 P.2d at 1351.
230. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. 331, 341, 741 P.2d 1345, 1351 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179
(1988).
231. Id.
232. Id. In Stanley, the court stated: "Few investigative reports can be written in a totally
objective manner void of the author's subjective attitudes." Stanley v. Big Eight Conference, 463
F. Supp. 920, 931 n.4 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
233. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. at 341, 741 P.2d at 1351.
234. Id. The court also stated that "this would attenuate the problem of a 'subjective coloring'
of the facts." Id. On appeal, the NCAA also argued that the trial court erred in refusing to grant
a continuance in order to allow Charles Allan Wright to testify and that the trial court should
have admitted a transcript of Mr. Wright's prior testimony before a congressional subcommittee.
Id. at 343, 741 P.2d at 1352. Mr. Wright, a noted law professor, was a member of the Committee
on Infractions. Id. The NCAA argued that the trial court's failure to allow his testimony war-
ranted reversal. Id. at 343, 741 P.2d at 1352-53. The court rejected the NCAA's argument, not-
ing that three members of the Committee on Infractions testified at trial, two of whom were law
professors. Id. at 343, 741 P.2d at 1353. "In these circumstances," the court wrote, "even if the
trial court did err, we fail to see how the NCAA was prejudiced." Id.
235. Id. at 331, 741 P.2d at 1345.
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preme Court, finding that the NCAA's actions were not taken under color of
state law and thus not subject to the strictures of the fourteenth amend-
ment.238 The Supreme Court began its state action analysis by reaffirming pre-
cedent holding that the protections of due process do not turn on the type of
conduct, but focus rather on whether the conduct is caused by a state actor.2 17
The Court then noted the general rule that the fourteenth amendment does
not extend to "private conduct abridging individual rights," no matter how
unjust the deprivation may be. 28 A litigant may invoke the protections guar-
anteed under due process only when the conduct is a result of state action.23 9
The Court explained the necessity to adhere closely to the state action re-
quirement.'4" Such adherence, it advised, seeks to balance two ends.241 First, it
attempts to limit the reach of individual federal law to maintain individual
freedom.2"2 Second, it seeks to avoid imposing responsibility on a state for
conduct over which it has no control.243 The Tarkanian Court noted that Con-
gress clearly specified that as a prerequisite for all section 1983 claims, the
questionable conduct must have been a result of state action.24
The Supreme Court summarized Tarkanian's position generally as contend-
ing "that the NCAA was a state actor because it misused power that it pos-
sessed by virtue of state law. 2 4 Tarkanian claimed that UNLV delegated the
power of regulating its athletic program to the NCAA.24 6 This delegation,
Tarkanian reasoned, clothed the NCAA with state authority to adopt rules
governing UNLV's athletic programs and to enforce those rules on behalf of
UNLV. 17 In holding for Tarkanian, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the
236. Tarkanian I11, 488 U.S. 179, 191-99 (1988).
237. Id. at 191. The Court stated: "Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is
a dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under the Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause, and private conduct, against which the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how
unfair that conduct may be." Id. (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
238. Id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982)).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Tarkanian II, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988).
[Wihen Congress enacted Section 1983 as the statutory remedy for violations of the
Constitution, it specified that the conduct at issue must have occurred under color of
state law; thus, liability attaches only to those wrongdoers "who carry a badge of
authority" of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accor-
dance with their authority or misuse it.
Id. (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)); see also United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 326 (1941) ("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state, is action taken 'under color of' state
law,").
245. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. at 191-92.
246. Id. at 192.
247. Id. (noting that "[s]imilarly, the Nevada Supreme Court held that UNLV had delegated
its authority over personnel decisions to the NCAA.").
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two entities acted jointly to deprive Tarkanian of liberty and property interest,
making the NCAA, as well as UNLV, a state actor.248
The Court, speaking through Justice Stevens, declared this reasoning to be a
fundamental distortion of the facts of the case.24'9 The Court reviewed the typi-
cal state action claim.150 The standard question, it noted, is whether the state
sufficiently participated in causing the conduct such that the action may prop-
erly be considered state action.251 Justice Stevens' majority opinion outlined
three scenarios under which this may occur. 52 The first is where the state
creates the legal framework under which the conduct legitimately may oc-
cur.2 53 The second situation is where the state delegates its authority to a pri-
vate actor.254 Finally, state action may arise if the state knowingly accepts the
benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior.2 55 Thus, the Court concluded
that it should be concerned with whether the state facilitated the harm by
granting power to an individual actor.256
The Court found that Tarkanian's case "uniquely" mirrored the traditional
state action case.257 The Court noted that Tarkanian's suspension was ulti-
mately the result of UNLV's conduct. 258 UNLV, a state university, the Court
stated, was indisputably a state actor.2 59 Thus, when UNLV notified
Tarkanian that he was being separated from all relations with the university's
basketball program, it acted under color of state law within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.260
Despite finding the case to mirror traditional state action cases, the Court
found it necessary to step through "an analytical looking glass" to resolve the
controversy. 6 ' The Court examined the peculiar problems posed by the facts
at hand. 62 The NCAA, a private party, played an influential role in determin-
ing the sanctions imposed.26 3 However, UNLV, a state entity, ultimately im-
248. Tarkanian II, 103 Nev. 331, 337, 741 P.2d 1345, 1349 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179
(1988).
249. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179, 192 (1988).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975)).
254. Id. (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)).
255. Id. (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
256. Id. As an example, the court cited Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351
(1974) ("IT]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and
the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be treated
as that of the State itself."). Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 177, 192 n.12 (1988).
257. Id. at 192.
258. Id.
259. Id. (providing that when a state university decides to impose a serious disciplinary sanc-
tion upon one of its tenured employees, it must comply with the terms of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution).
260. Id. at 193.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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posed the suspension.2 64 Thus, the Supreme Court framed the question as
whether UNLV's cooperation with the NCAA rules and recommendations
turned the NCAA's conduct into state action. 265
The Court first examined the relationship between UNLV and the NCAA
regarding the NCAA's rulemaking.2" The Court reasoned that since UNLV
was among the NCAA's members and participated in promulgating the asso-
ciation's rules, the state had some impact on the NCAA's policy determina-
tions.217 However, the Court noted, UNLV is just one of several hundred other
public and private institutions which participate in formulating the policies
and procedures of the NCAA. 268 The Court found, therefore, that NCAA pol-
icy was the result of a "collective membership," rather than the sole influence
of the state of Nevada.2 69
In dicta, the Court recognized that a different outcome would result if the
entire NCAA membership consisted of institutions located within the same
state.2 70 Furthermore, the Court conceded that state action might lie if Ne-
vada had incorporated the NCAA's rules into state law.27 ' The Court deter-
mined that this would be sufficient to transform the NCAA into a state ac-
tor. 2712 On this point, the Court noted that UNLV engaged in state action in
adopting the NCAA's rules to govern its own behavior. 27 ' But, according to
the Court, "that would be true even if UNLV had taken no part in the pro-
mulgation of those rules. ' 274 The Court warned, however, that the NCAA's
formulation of those disciplinary rules did not implicate state action.2 75 To
draw an analogy, the Court relied on its decision in Bates v. State Bar.27 6 The
Bates decision concerned Arizona's complete adoption of the American Bar
Association Code of Professional Responsibility.27 7 In Bates, the district court
held that state action existed in the Arizona Supreme Court's enforcement of
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. The Court took note of the fact that the vast majority of these institutions were located
in states other than Nevada. Id. The NCAA, therefore, could not be said to act under color of
Nevada law. Id.
269. Id. at 193-94 (citing Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,
501 (1988) ("Whatever de facto authority the [private standard-setting] Association enjoys, no
official authority has been conferred on it by any government. ... )).
270. Id. at 193 n.13 (citing Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n v. St. Augustine
High School, 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1969)). The majority noted that even the dissent does not
dispute the fact that the NCAA does not act under color of state law in its relationships with
private universities, which constitute the bulk of its membership. Id.
271. Id. at 194.
272. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1983)).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
277. Id. at 360 n.12.
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disciplinary rules against members of its own bar.27 '8 The Supreme Court
found that no state action existed because the state supreme court retained the
power to review and reject those standards it opposed.279 The Tarkanian Court
reasoned that the same important considerations were present in Tarkanian;
the university, noted the Court, had several available alternatives. 8 0 First,
UNLV retained the authority to review and reject NCAA rules by withdraw-
ing from NCAA membership.281 Second, the university could have continued
participating in the association and lobbied to amend the rules or standards it
deemed unfair. 82
The Court was unpersuaded by Tarkanian's argument that the NCAA's in-
vestigation, enforcement proceedings, and consequent recommendations were
the result of state action via the state's delegation of such power to the
NCAA. 83 The Court acknowledged that a state may transform a private
party into a state actor by delegating its authority to that private party.28'
However, it found that UNLV had not delegated any power to the NCAA to
discipline persons employed by UNLV. 88 In fact, the NCAA's power was lim-
ited to disciplining only UNLV itself, not any individual directly. 28
The Supreme Court flatly rejected the notion that UNLV's cooperation with
278. Id. at 359-63.
279. Id. at 362.
280. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179, 194-95 (1988).
UNLV retained the authority to withdraw from the NCAA and establish its own
standards. The University alternatively could have stayed in the Association and
worked through the Association's legislative process to amend rules or standards it
deemed harsh, unfair, or unwieldy. Neither UNLV's decision to adopt the NCAA's
standards nor its minor role in their formulation is a sufficient reason for concluding
that the NCAA was acting under color of Nevada law when it promulgated standards
governing athlete recruitment, eligibility and academic performance.
Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. "UNLV, as an NCAA member, subscribed to the statement in the Association's by-
laws that NCAA enforcement procedures are an essential part of the intercollegiate athletic pro-
gram of each member institution." Id.
284. Id. (citing West v. Atkins 487 U.S. 42 (1988)). In West, the Court held that a private
physician who had contracted with a state prison to attend to the inmates' medical needs was a
state actor. West, 487 U.S. at 48-57.
285. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179, 195-96 (1988).
286. Id. at 196. The Court noted that the NCAA possessed no governmental powers to facili-
tate the investigation. Id. at 197. Specifically, it possessed no authority to subpoena witnesses, to
impose contempt sanctions, or to assert sovereign authority over any individual. Id. According to
the Court, the Nevada Supreme Court erred in its determination that the NCAA could directly
discipline Tarkanian or any other state university employee. Id. In support of this finding, the
Court looked to the express terms of the confidential report. Id. at 197-98. It noted that the
NCAA did not unconditionally demand Tarkanian's suspension. Id. at 198. It merely requested
"the University ...to show cause" why the NCAA should not impose additional penalties if
UNLV refused to discipline its coach. Id. As further support, the Court stated that even UNLV's
vice president acknowledged the alternatives available to the university, other than suspending
Tarkanian. Id.
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the NCAA enforcement proceedings constituted a partnership agreement or
the transfer of UNLV's powers to the NCAA.287 The Court noted that UNLV
had in fact endeavored to work against the NCAA's sanctioning its winning
coach.2 88 The NCAA and UNLV acted more like opponents rather than team-
mates cooperating in a dispassionate search for the truth.289 Thus, the NCAA
could not be regarded as an agent of UNLV for purposes of the enforcement
proceeding.2 19 Instead, the association must be considered as an agent of its
remaining members that, as competitors of UNLV, had an interest in the ef-
fective and evenhanded enforcement of the NCAA's recruitment standards.2 91
The Court concluded that the NCAA was properly viewed as a private ac-
tor.292 The majority was persuaded by the NCAA's argument that its priority
is to represent the interests of the collective membership, rather than to
achieve the goals of any one particular member.293
Relying on Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,29' Tarkanian argued
that UNLV and the NCAA were "joint participants" in state action.29 The
Burton decision involved a lease relationship between a restaurant and a park-
ing structure which resulted in "an incidental variety of mutual benefits. 298
The Burton Court held that the private restaurant and public parking author-
ity acted jointly in violation of the fourteenth amendment when the restaurant
discriminated against patrons on the basis of race.27 The Tarkanian Court,
however, distinguished Burton.298 The Court based the distinction on the fact
that Tarkanian involved a situation where the state and private parties' rele-
vant interests were inapposite. 99 In fact, the Court noted, UNLV and the
NCAA were antagonists, not joint participants. 00 Under such a scenario, the
Court reasoned, the NCAA may not be deemed a state actor.80'
Tarkanian also argued that the NCAA had assumed the state's traditional
and exclusive power to discipline its employees. 0 2 The Court rejected this ar-
287. Id. at 196 (noting this idea was simply."belied by the history of this case").
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. Similarly, a public defender employed by the state acts in a private capacity when she
represents a private client in a conflict against the state. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
320 (1981).
294. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
295. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179, 196 n.16 (1988).
296. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724. The mutual benefits included tax exemptions for the restaurant,
rent payments for the parking authority, and increased business for both. Id.
297. Id. at 725.
298. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. at 196 n.16.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 197-98 n.18. Tarkanian argued, "the NCAA requires that its standards, procedures
and determinations become the State's standards, procedures and determinations for disciplining
state employees .... The State is obligated to impose NCAA standards, procedures and determi-
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gument, reasoning that the contention overlooked the fact that the NCAA's
own legislation prohibits it from taking any direct action against Tarkanian. 303
Suspending Tarkanian, the Court continued, was only one alternative ad-
dressed in the confidential report."0' These recommendations were intended to
assist UNLV in correcting past infractions and allowing it to begin compliance
with NCAA rules. 0 5
Finally, the Court rebuked Tarkanian's contention that the influence of the
NCAA is so expansive that its recommendations have the practical effect of a
mandate. 06 The Court stated that a private party does not act under state law
by merely threatening to refuse to deal with a state agency. 307 The question
the Court ultimately answered was whether "the conduct allegedly causing the
deprivation of a federal right [can] be fairly attributable to the State."30 8 The
Court answered with a resounding "no."309 It stated that it would be illogical
to conclude that the NCAA sanctions recommended against Tarkanian, and
vehemently opposed by UNLV and its counsel, were fairly attributable to the
State of Nevada. 310 Instead, the Court interpreted these facts as indicia that
UNLV conducted its athletic program in conformity with the policies adopted
by the NCAA, rather than that those policies were developed and enforced
under color of Nevada law. " '
B. The Dissent
The dissent concurred with the majority's holding that the public univer-
sity's suspension of a public employee constituted state action." 3 However,
Justice White, writing for the dissenters, framed the issue as whether the
NCAA's participation with UNLV in suspending Tarkanian implicated the
NCAA as a state actor.3 13 The dissenters concluded that it did.31' Justice
nations making the NCAA a joint participant in the State's suspension .... " Id. at 198 n.18
(citing Brief for Respondent at 34-35) (emphases in original).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 198. The majority was not at all sure this was true. The Court stated that UNLV's
"desire to remain a powerhouse among the nation's college basketball teams is understandable,
and nonmembership in the NCAA obviously would thwart that goal. But that UNLV's options
were unpalatable does not mean that they were nonexistent." Id. at 198 n.19.
307. Id. at 199 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1974)
(granting of monopoly status by the state to a private entity does not convert the private party into
a state actor)).
308. Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
309. Id. ("It would be ironic indeed to conclude that the NCAA's imposition of sanctions
against UNLV . . . is fairly attributable to the State of Nevada.").
310. Id.
311. Id. Consequently, the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court's decision was reversed,
and the case was remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Su-
preme Court's opinion. Id.
312. Id. Justice White wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor.
313. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (unanimously finding that UNLV, a public university, was a
state actor, and that the suspension of Jerry Tarkanian, a public employee, was state action).
314. Id.
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White recognized that the facts in the Tarkanian case were different from the
typical prior state action cases addressed by the Court.8 15 He questioned the
majority's application of precedent in this case, stating that the facts presented
in Tarkanian did not neatly fit within the traditional state action case. 16
Here, Justice White noted, the suspension implemented against Tarkanian was
committed by a state actor.8 17
He argued that the situation presented by the Tarkanian case was neither
unknown nor unique to the Court. " 8 In both Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,"19
and Dennis v. Sparks,320 Justice White recalled, the Court considered the
question of whether private parties could be state actors in a situation where
the decisive act was carried out by the state. 21 The dissent noted that in both
cases the Court held that private parties may be deemed state actors if the
action was a result of the parties' joint cooperation. 22
Justice White found that the facts of the Tarkanian case indicated that the
NCAA played an integral role in UNLV's suspension of Tarkanian . 23 Several
factors led the dissent to this conclusion. First, Tarkanian was suspended
under NCAA rules which UNLV adopted via its membership in the
NCAA.12' Second, UNLV delegated to the NCAA the responsibility to con-
duct the hearings concerning violations of NCAA rules.3 25 Justice White em-
315. Id. Justice White noted that the facts in Tarkanian did not consist of the typical state
action issue where "a private party has taken the decisive step that caused the harm to the plain-
tiff." Id. at 199-200. (White, J., dissenting).
316. Id.
317. Id. at 200. (White, J., dissenting).
318. Id.
319. 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (concluding that plaintiff was entitled to relief under § 1983 against
private party if she could prove that private party and police officer "reached an understanding"
to cause her arrest on impermissible grounds).
320. 449 U.S. 24 (1980). The Dennis decision involved a § 1983 cause of action against a
private party and state judge who illegally conspired to enjoin the plaintiff from producing miner-
als from certain oil leases. The plaintiff challenged the injunction, alleging that it had been issued
as the result of a corrupt conspiracy between the judge and the other defendants. Id. at 26. The
district court held for the plaintiff and dissolved the injunction as having been illegally issued. Id.
at 25. Nonetheless, the court held that the defendants were immune from § 1983 liability under
the doctrine of judicial immunity. Id. at 26. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling
which immunized the judge from suit, but reversed the decision to dismiss the claims against the
other conspiring defendants. Id. at 27. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the court of
appeals, noting that the judge's absolute immunity from § 1983 claims does not extend to private
individuals who corruptly conspire with the state or its agents. Id. at 28-29.
321. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179, 200 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
322. Id. (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980)).
323. Id. at 200-01 (White, J., dissenting).
324. Id. "[A]s a member of the NCAA, UNLV contractually agrees to administer its athletic
program in accordance with NCAA legislation." Id. In fact, Justice White noted, NCAA rules
provide that NCAA "enforcement procedures are an essential part of the intercollegiate athletic
program of each member institution." Id.
325. Id. at 201 (White, J., dissenting).
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phasized the fact that the NCAA conducted the hearings that led to the
lawsuit.3 26
Finally, the NCAA and UNLV had agreed to give binding effect to the
findings of fact made by the NCAA at the hearings it conducted.117 Justice
White reasoned that UNLV's membership meant more than a promise to co-
operate.3 28 He noted that UNLV's membership in the NCAA was contingent
upon UNLV's agreement to accept the NCAA's findings of fact as final and
not subject to further review by any other body. 29 The NCAA, the dissent
concluded, had forced UNLV's hand.3"' On these facts, the dissenters declared
that the NCAA was jointly engaged with UNLV officials and therefore should
be deemed a state actor.33 1
Justice White acknowledged that since the Supreme Court's decisions in
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,3"' Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,"'3 and Blum v.
Yaretsky,334 appellate courts have been unanimous in determining that the
NCAA was not a state actor.335 However, he stressed, none of those cases
dealt with the theory advanced in Tarkanian.336
In closing, Justice White agreed that if UNLV refused to suspend
Tarkanian, and the NCAA responded by imposing sanctions against UNLV,
there would be no state action that harmed Tarkanian. 3 ' However, according
to Justice White, such a situation was not present here because UNLV did, in
fact, suspend Tarkanian.83 8 The university did so only because its membership
in the NCAA required it to adopt the NCAA rules and accept the results of
the hearings conducted by the NCAA. 33 9 Under these circumstances, Justice
White concluded that the NCAA acted jointly with UNLV and therefore was
326. Although the university conducted its own investigation into the matter, the NCAA Com-
mittee on Infractions made the final decisions regarding factual determinations. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. (stating that the terms of UNLV's membership forced the university to suspend
Tarkanian even though it adamantly disputed the NCAA's findings).
330. Id. Justice White stated, "In short, it was the NCAA's finding that Tarkanian had vio-
lated NCAA rules, made at NCAA-conducted hearings, all of which were agreed to by UNLV in
its membership agreement with the NCAA, that resulted in Tarkanian's suspension by UNLV."
Id. at 202 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted).
331. Id. (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980)).
332. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
333. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
334. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
335. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179, 202 n.2 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (citing McCormack v.
NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir. 1988); Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258, 261 (6th Cir.
1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 1986); Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d
1019, 1021-1022 (4th Cir. 1984)).
336. Justice White's dissenting opinion noted that the case most often cited, Arlosoroff v.
NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984), failed to address the possibility of joint action between
the NCAA and a public university. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. at 203 (White, J., dissenting).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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a state actor.3 40
IV. DISCUSSION
The analysis of the Tarkanian majority is full of inconsistencies. Rather
than lay an analytical framework to guide practitioners as to when and where
state action exists, the Court chose instead to wrangle with the reasoning of
the dissent and the arguments put forth on behalf of Tarkanian.
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that as a
predicate for its disposition, the Nevada court had held that the NCAA en-
gaged in state action."4 1 The Court also acknowledged that several strands of
the argument supported this holding. 42 Given the Court's ultimate holding
however, these acknowledgements are a strange way for the Court to begin its
analysis. In essence, the Court builds its case by tearing down arguments in
favor of state action, rather than laying the groundwork for a finding that it
does not exist.
The majority spent a considerable amount of effort attacking the dissent's
reliance on Dennis v. Sparks34  as a means of justifying its own position. 34'
The Tarkanian majority did not find the facts involved in Dennis to be analo-
gous to the facts at hand.345 Dennis involved a situation where both parties, a
corporation and a judge, explicitly entered into a conspiracy to perform an
illegal act.3"1 According to the Dennis Court, the private parties who conspired
with the judge were acting under color of state law.3 47
The Court distinguished Dennis from Tarkanian because it found no sug-
gestion of any impropriety respecting the agreement between the NCAA and
UNLV.34' The majority criticized the dissent's assumption that the NCAA's
liability as a state actor depended on whether UNLV ultimately accepted the
340. Id. at 203 (White, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 190.
342. Id.
343. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
344. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179, 197 n.17 (1988). The Court's split is ultimately based on the
differing interpretations by the majority and the dissent of Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
In Dennis, a state trial judge enjoined the production of minerals from oil leases owned by the
plaintiff. Id. at 25. The injunction was later dissolved on appeal as having been issued illegally. Id.
The plaintiff then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the
judge had conspired with the party seeking the original injunction (a private corporation) the sole
owner of the corporation, and the two sureties on the injunction bond to deprive the plaintiff of
due process by corruptly issuing the injunction. Id. at 24-25. The Supreme Court held unani-
mously that under the facts as alleged, the private parties were state actors because they were
"willful participant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents." Id. at 27.
345. Tarkanian Ill, 488 U.S. at 197.
346. Dennis, 449 U.S. at 25-26.
347. Id. at 27-28. The Tarkanian Court reiterated that it was inconsequential that the judge in
Dennis was immune from damages liability. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. at 197 n.17 (citation omit-
ted). Immunity, the Tarkanian majority stated, did not legitimize the judge's or his co-conspira-
tors' actions. Id. Furthermore, one must act within legal guidelines to invoke immunity. Id.
348. Id.
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NCAA's recommended discipline of Tarkanian instead of the initial agree-
ment between UNLV and the NCAA.349 Dennis was found to be distinguisha-
ble because the conspirators became state actors as soon as they formed the
corrupt bargain with the judge.350
However, the dissent noted that the majority's objections to finding state
action in this case were implicitly rejected by the Dennis decision.851 Accord-
ing to the dissenters, the Tarkanian majority had relied on the fact that the
NCAA did not have any power to take action directly against Tarkanian as
support for its finding that the NCAA was not a state actor.352 But as the
dissent noted, the private parties in Dennis likewise did not have any power to
take action directly against the plaintiff.353 Only the trial judge could impose
the injunction.3""
The distinction the majority attempts to make is certainly one without con-
sequence. In the majority's final analysis, only the triggerman is liable. While
determination of "impropriety" may offer a bright line distinction, the lines of
demarcation are not that clear. As with any participant, whether willing or
unwilling, the key is whether the participant ultimately takes the desired ac-
tion. Here, the bottom falls out of the majority's reasoning when a willing
participant is substituted for the allegedly unwilling UNLV. Had UNLV co-
operated with the NCAA, Tarkanian still would have ended up in the same
position. 5 As the dissent noted, the majority's extensive reliance on the fact
that the NCAA and UNLV were adversaries throughout the proceedings
before the NCAA was misplaced.3 56 The fact that UNLV and the NCAA
were adversaries should not have been determinative. Rather, the controlling
factor was that ultimately UNLV, a state actor, agreed to take the action the
NCAA wanted: to suspend Tarkanian. 57
In support of its impractical conclusion, the Court also noted that the
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 202 (White, J., dissenting).
352. id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. In another recent NCAA investigation, the University of Illinois cooperated in the pro-
ceedings only to be assessed severe penalties for self-reported violations. Sherman, NCAA Dunks
lllini Program, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 7, 1990, § 4, at 1, col. 2.
356. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179, 203 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
357. Id. According to Justice White:
The majority provides a detailed description of UNLV's attempts to avoid the imposi-
tion of sanctions by the NCAA. But this opportunity for opposition, provided for by
the terms of the membership agreement between UNLV and the NCAA, does not
understand the agreement itself. Surely our decision in Dennis would not have been
different had the private parties permitted the trial judge to seek to persuade them
that he should not grant the injunction before finally holding the judge to his agree-
ment with them to do so. The key there, as with any conspiracy, is that ultimately
parties agreed to take the action.
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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NCAA's bylaws permit review of penalties, even after they are imposed,
"upon a showing of newly discovered evidence which is directly related to the
findings in the case, or that there was a prejudicial error in the procedure
which was followed in the processing of the case by the Committee."35 8 Thus,
the Court suggested that UNLV could have sought review of the penalties,
perhaps based on the Nevada trial court's finding that the NCAA's investiga-
tor was biased against Tarkanian. " This suggestion is simply naive. Why
should the NCAA, when it has been perceived as biased during the entire
investigation, be perceived any differently during a review of that investiga-
tion? The Court's suggestion is akin to asking a card dealer to reshuffle a
stacked deck. He would be more than glad to do so because the cards are
already stacked in his favor. Now, however, the Court has said that the
dealer-here, the NCAA--does not even have to reshuffle the deck. Once
again, the "house" wins.
The majority also targeted Tarkanian's argument that the NCAA, by its
rules and enforcement procedures, had usurped a traditional, essential state
function.,6 The Court tossed Tarkanian a free throw when it noted that
Tarkanian had been correct in not pointing to the NCAA's overriding function
of promoting amateur athletics at the college level.361 Although the Court had
previously conceded this function as "critical," ' 2 it reasserted that "by no
means is it a traditional, let alone an exclusive, state function."363 Instead,
Tarkanian argued that the NCAA assumed the state's traditional and exclu-
sive power to discipline its employees.3 64 The Court rejected this argument in a
footnote, simplly because the NCAA's own legislation prohibits it from taking
any direct action against Tarkanian.3 16 Moreover, the Court continued, "sus-
pension of Tarkanian is one of many recommendations in the Confidential Re-
port. Those recommendations as a whole were intended to bring UNLV's bas-
ketball program into compliance with NCAA rules. Suspension of Tarkanian
was but one means toward achieving that goal."366
The Court's rationale is simply one of semantics. Of course, the Court fails
to recall that the NCAA has the power to sanction member institutions. In
essence, what the Court is saying is that it is all right to sink a ship as a means
of disciplining an individual sailor. However, in the Court's eyes, such an ac-
tion is not a direct action against the sailor, but rather one against his ship. If
the sailor drowns in the process of the ship sinking, so be it.
Of course, in the majority's final analysis, one might suggest that the ship
358. Id. at 195 n.15 (citations omitted).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 197 n.19. The Nevada Supreme Court reached this decision. See Tarkanian II, 103
Nev. 331, 337, 741 P.2d 1345, 1348-49 (1987), revd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
361. Tarkanian III, 488 U.S. 179, 198 n.18 (1988).
362. Id. (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
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abandon the fleet. Surely this is what the majority suggested when it stated
that UNLV was free to withdraw from the NCAA at any time.367 Granted,
withdrawal is another alternative, but the sailor is left aboard a ship sentenced
to a dry dock. Ultimately, the desired result is achieved-a type of suspension.
This is why the dissent criticized as irrelevant the majority's viewpoint that
UNLV was free to withdraw from the NCAA at any time.368 In an almost
mocking tone, the dissent stated that UNLV did have the option "to [p]ull out
of the NCAA completely."3 69 Similarly, the dissent pointed out that the trial
judge in Dennis could have withdrawn from his agreement at any time as
well. 370 Justice White reasoned, however, that the option to withdraw was ir-
relevant in light of his entering into an agreement.3 71 The key point in Dennis
was not that the judge could have withdrawn from the conspiracy, but rather
that he did not withdraw.372
V. CONCLUSION
The NCAA should not escape judicial review simply by a finding that the
institution involved is an unwilling participant in an NCAA proceeding. Until
recently., most universities and colleges were unwilling participants in any in-
vestigation, vigorously contesting the NCAA when it came to enforcement
matters for one simple reason: money.3 73 In an attempt to avoid violations,
some institutions have even sought the advice of outside counsel.374 Recently,
some schools have decided to cooperate fully with any NCAA investigations in
the hope that such compliance would be rewarded with a "lighter sentence. 3 75
This trend began after Southern Methodist University received the death pen-
alty in 1981.171 The approach evidently backfired on the University of Illinois
when it was recently slapped with relatively stiff penalties, despite being
cleared of all major allegations. 7' The sanctions against Illinois' basketball
367. Id. at 194-95.
368. Id. at 202-03 (White, J., dissenting).
369. Id. at 202 (citation omitted).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 203.
373. For example, the University of Alabama lost $253,447 in basketball receipts from the
1987 NCAA basketball tournament because two of its players, Derrick McKey and Terry Coner,
dealt with agents before their eligibility expired. New York Times, Dec. 16, 1987, at BI, col. 5.
374. In fact, the University of Miami, seeking to minimize the risk of NCAA violations, pays a
Kansas City law firm approximately $50,000 a year to monitor and investigate its athletic pro-
gram. Philadelphia Inquirer, June 21, 1990, at 8-E, col. 2 ("The practice is not unique, but,
because of the cost, it is unusual. The NCAA and certain conferences offer similar services for
free, but Miami prefers to pay for a more comprehensive study, athletic director Sam Jankovich
said.").
375. See Wieberg, NCAA to Hear Two Schools' Final Appeals, USA Today, Aug. 10, 1990,
at 2C, col. 1.
376. Id.
377. Sherman, supra note 355, at 1, col. 2.
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program were largely premised on self-reported incidents.378
In short, it should be the procedures of the NCAA which should be re-
viewed, not whether the institution is a willing or unwilling participant in the
investigation or proceedings. And if NCAA procedures, be they hearings or
investigations, do not conform with one's sense of fair play, then the NCAA
sanction should not be valid. Presently, the only procedural safeguards availa-
ble during any NCAA enforcement hearing are notice of the charge and an
opportunity to appear at the hearing.171 In addition, at a minimum, member
institutions and participating individuals should be provided the following pro-
cedural safeguards:"8 '
378. Id.
379. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, at 273 (NCAA Operating Bylaw 19.3).
380. A proposed bill in the Illinois legislature would require more procedural due process safe-
guards. H.B. 3182, 86th Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. In fact, it would give colleges under investiga-
tion by the NCAA rights similar to those now enjoyed by criminal defendants, including the right
to suppress illegally obtained evidence. Provisions of the Illinois bill state:
Section 3. Hearing required as prerequisite to finding of violation; Procedures ap-
plying at hearing.(a) No penalty may be imposed by a collegiate athletic association on any institu-
tion of higher education operating in the State of Illinois, nor shall any collegiate
athletic association require or cause any institution of higher education to impose a
penalty on any student or employee, unless the findings upon which the penalties are
based are made at a formal hearing in conformity with the rules in this Section. Any
association may adopt rules prescribing the procedures for such a hearing, including
the method of selecting a presiding officer, provided that such rules are not inconsis-
tent with this Act.
(b) Any finding must be made in writing and supported by clear and convincing
evidence.
(c) Any individual employee or student who is charged with misconduct must be
notified, in writing prior to the hearing of the specific charges against that individual,
that a hearing will be held at a specific date and time to determine the truth of the
charges, and that a finding that the misconduct occurred may result in penalties im-
posed on the institution or imposed by the institution on the individual. The institution
shall also be notified in writing of the hearing on the charges.
(d) Any such person or institution has a right to have counsel present, to interro-
gate and cross-examine witnesses, and to present a complete defense.
(e) The rules of evidence applying at civil trials in Illinois shall apply at such
hearings.
(f) Any individual charged with misconduct which might result in a penalty, and
the institution with which he or she is associated, shall be entitled to full disclosure of
all facts and matters relevant to the same degree as a defendant in a criminal case
and shall have the same right to discovery as applies in criminal and civil cases.
(g) Any individual or institution may suppress at the hearing any evidence garnered
from any interrogation of any party if the evidence was not procured in accordance
with Section 5 or if obtained indirectly because of interrogation not in conformity
with Section 5.
(h) Any hearing shall be open to the public unless any party charged with miscon-
duct or the institution involved objects.
(i) No hearing may be held on any given charge unless commenced within 6
months of the date on which the institution of higher education first receives notice of
any kind from the association that it is investigating a possible violation of its rules,
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(1) The right to a fair and impartial hearing;
(2) The right to a public hearing;
(3) The right to have counsel present;
(4) The right to present a complete defense involving the right to cross-
examine witnesses;
(5) The right to full disclosure and discovery of all facts and matters
relevant;
(6) The right to a speedy hearing.
However, it would seem that formal rules of evidence need not apply, only that
hearsay be inadmissible. Furthermore, it would seem that Miranda-type warn-
ings will only perpetuate cheating and more unfairness.
The Nebraska Legislature apparently agrees. Recently, the Cornhusker
State enacted the Nebraska Collegiate Athletic Association Procedures Act. 81
or, in a situation in which the institution itself brings the possibility of a violation to
the attention of the association, unless commenced within nine months of the date
such notice is provided to the association. The running of the 6 or 9 month period
shall be tolled because of any delay occasioned by the institution or individual being
investigated, whether or not for good cause. Any individual charged with a violation
or the institution with which he or she is affiliated may petition the circuit court for a
determination of whether the provisions of this subsection (i) have been violated prior
to proceeding with the hearing. The filing of any such petition tolls the running of the
6 or 9 month period.
(j) Any findings made pursuant to the hearing under this Section are subject to
review in the circuit court based on the standard of whether the findings are consis-
tent with the manifest weight of the evidence.
Id.
381. The Nebraska statute provides:
Be it enacted by the people of the State of Nebraska,
Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the Nebraska Collegiate
Athletic Association Procedures Act.
Section 2. The Legislature hereby finds and declares that:
(1) The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a national unincorporated asso-
ciation consisting of public and private colleges and universities and is a private mo-
nopolist that controls intercollegiate athletics throughout the United States;
(2) The National Collegiate Athletic Association adopts rules governing member
institutions' admissions, academic eligibility, and financial aid standards for collegiate
athletes;
(3) A member must agree contractually to administer its athletic program in accor-
dance with National Collegiate Athletic Association legislation;
(4) National Collegiate Athletic Association rules provide that association enforce-
ment procedures are an essential part of the intercollegiate athletic program of each
member institution;
(5) The National Collegiate Athletic Association exercises great power over mem-
b r institutions by virtue of its monopolistic control of intercollegiate athletics and its
power to prevent a nonconforming institution from competing in intercollegiate ath-
letic events or contests;
(6) Substantial monetary loss, serious disruption of athletic programs, and signifi-
cant damage to reputation may result from the imposition of penalties on a college or
university by the National Collegiate Athletic Association for what the association
determines to be a violation of its rules; and
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In short, the Act requires the NCAA to comply with due process of law as
guaranteed by the Nebraska Constitution. 82
It is unclear whether the Nebraska Act will be challenged in the near fu-
ture, not to mention whether it will pass constitutional muster. 8 ' However,
similar acts have been proposed in South Carolina, Florida, Kentucky, Illi-
nois,384 and in Congress. 8 ' If enacted, the state laws of Florida and Illinois
(7) Because of such potentially serious and far reaching consequences, all proceed-
ings which may result in the imposition of any penalty by the National Collegiate
Athletic Association should be subject to the requirements of due process of law.
Section 3. Every stage and facet of all proceedings of a collegiate athletic associa-
tion, college, or university that may result in the imposition of a penalty for violation
of such association's rule or legislation shall comply with due process of law as guar-
anteed by the Constitution of Nebraska and the laws of Nebraska.
Section 4. No collegiate athletic association shall impose a penalty on any college
or university for violation of such association's rule or legislation in violation of the
due process requirements of the Nebraska Collegiate Athletic Association Procedures
Act.
Section 5. No collegiate athletic association shall impose a penalty on any college
or university for failure to take disciplinary action against an employee or student for
violation of such association's rule or legislation in violation of the due process re-
quirements of the Nebraska Collegiate Athletic Association Procedures Act.
Section 6. A collegiate athletic association that violates the Nebraska Collegiate
Athletic Association Procedures Act shall be liable to the aggrieved college or univer-
sity in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. No
penalty shall be threatened against or imposed upon an aggrieved college or university
for seeking redress pursuant to this section.
Section 7. In addition to costs and a reasonable attorney's fee, a collegiate athletic
association that violates the Nebraska Collegiate Athletic Association Procedures Act
shall be liable to the aggrieved college or university for an amount equal to one hun-
dred percent of the monetary loss per year or portion of a year suffered during the
period that any monetary loss occurs due to a penalty imposed in violation of the act.
For purposes of calculating monetary loss, one hundred percent of the yearly loss shall
be equal to the gross amount realized by the affected athletic program during the
immediately preceding calendar year.
Section 8. A collegiate athletic association, college, or university which subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any employee or student to a penalty in violation of the Ne-
braska Collegiate Athletic Association Procedures Act shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. No
penalty shall be threatened against or imposed upon an aggrieved party for seeking
redress pursuant to this section. In addition to any other relief granted, an aggrieved
employee or student shall be awarded costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
Section 9. Any penalty imposed by any collegiate athletic association, college, or
university shall be subject to judicial review in the district court.
Section 10. The remedies provided in the Nebraska Collegiate Athletic Association
Procedures Act are cumulative and in addition to any other remedies provided by law.
1990 Neb. Laws L.B. 397.
382. Id.
383. It is unknown whether the NCAA is currently investigating any member institutions lo-
cated in the State of Nebraska.
384. Marcotte, Regulating Sports-Bills, Suits Seek Due Process Protections for NCAA Ath-
letes, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1990, at 40. For the relevant portions of the text of the Illinois bill, see supra
note 380.
385. S. 2996, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R. 5464, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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would have the best chance of being reviewed, given repeated NCAA investi-
gations at those two state universities over the years.386
If nothing else, such a "grass roots" movement will pressure the NCAA into
comporting with due process of law during its investigations and hearings of
member institutions. Given all the power the NCAA now has in light of the
Court's decision in Tarkanian, the NCAA should remember that its power is
derived solely from its membership."' 1 Ye who giveth, can also taketh away.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
On March 28, 1990, Jerry Tarkanian's thirteen-year court battle with the
NCAA ended when both sides reached an agreement preventing the NCAA
from seeking the two-year suspension of Tarkanian, that the organization had
originally requested in 1977.388 The agreement required Tarkanian to pay the
NCAA over $20,000 in legal fees incurred at the Supreme Court level, as well
as to assume his own legal fees, which amounted to $350,000.189
Five days later, "[i]n an awesome display of power, discipline and sparkle,
the Rebels breezed to the championship of college basketball, thrashing Duke,
103-73, . . . before a sellout crowd of 17,000 . .. to win its first national
championship." 9 ' It was not a contest, "it was a carnage."391 "UNLV's point
total was the highest in any NCAA final, and the thirty-point margin of vic-
tory was the largest in any national title game." '392 UNLV's field goal percent-
age was an astounding 61.2%-the fourth-best performance in an NCAA
championship game.393 The Rebels also unleashed one of the finest defensive
exhibitions in tournament history, a performance that left their coach saying
that his team had played "about as well as we could play" and had Duke
coach Mike Krzyzewski saying he was "in awe." 39 '
386. Sherman, supra note 355, at 1, col. 2.
387. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, passim.
388. Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 29, 1990. at 8-D, col. 1.
389. Id.
390. Missanelli, The Rebels Run Right to the Top: UNLV Crushes Duke to Win National
Title, Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 3, 1990, at 1-C, col. 5. ("You can call us bad. You can call us
thugs. You can call us hoodlums. But at the end of that, please call us national champions, too,"
UNLV forward Larry Johnson said.).
391. Id. Four UNLV starters hit double figures, led by Anderson Hunt, "a spunky, 6-foot-2-
inch sophomore guard from Detroit." Id. Hunt racked up 29 points, including four three-pointers.
Id. For his performance, Hunt was named the most valuable player in the Final Four. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. During the year, Duke was one of the most efficient ball-handling teams in college
basketball. Id. at 4-C, col. 1. However, UNLV forced Duke into 23 turnovers, leading to 32
UNLV points. Id. Hounded by tournament MVP Anderson Hunt and Greg Anthony, Duke
guards Bobby Hurley and Phil Henderson combined for 11 turnovers. Id. Hurley scored only two
points. Id. Henderson scored 21, 9-for-20 from the field but only 1-for-8 from three-point range.
Id.
19911
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"It was an incredible display of basketball," observed Krzyzewski. 395 "Their
half-court defense is the best in the country. They dictated the basketball
game to us. Their defense led to their offense. They were so positive offensively
because they knew they were in such control defensively."' 96
Leading by ten points with 16:24 remaining, UNLV scored eighteen unan-
swered points in the next three minutes, giving the Rebels an insurmountable
75-47 lead with 13:14 left. 97 "It was all over but the post-game celebration
and Brent Musburger's farewell sign-off from CBS Sports." 98
"In an awkward scene at center court, Tarkanian accepted the champion-
ship trophy from an NCAA official" and thanked "'the great fans of Nevada
for their support.' "31 Speculation about forthcoming NCAA sanctions cast a
shadow over the celebration. 00 Some three months later, UNLV was indeed
nailed by the NCAA: UNLV is ineligible for postseason play in 1992.401
395. Id. at 4-C.
396. Id. Krzyzewski continued, "They are so physically and mentally mature and focused," he
stated. "They played beyond anyone we had played this year. That's the best anyone has ever
played against me. We were ready to play. They just wouldn't let us. I'm truly in awe." Id.
"I'm proud of my guys," the Duke coach said. "I'm sorry we didn't give [UNLV] a better
challenge. But we win and lose together. This team, I think, came closer to realizing its potential
than perhaps any team I've had. We just got beat by a great basketball team." Id.
After eight minutes, the Rebels had a 10-point lead. "[Anderson] Hunt, perhaps the least her-
alded started on the UNLV juggernaut, scored 10 of the team's first 23 point and hit his first four
shots from the floor, leaving [Phil] Henderson, perhaps Duke's best defender," grabbing for air.
Id.
"[Hunt] never got tired," Henderson said. "He ran the floor very well. And that made it diffi-
cult for me to find out where he was all the time." Id.
With four minutes left in the first half, the Runnin' Rebels had a 16-point lead. Id. The Rebels'
lead at half time was 47-35 after Greg Anthony went the length of the floor and made a runner at
the buzzer. Id. Tarkanian had started the game with his team in a man-to-man defense. Id. Later
in the first half, and again after Larry Johnson and Greg Anthony picked up their third fouls
early in the second half, he went to his so-called "amoeba" zone. Id.
"And that destroyed [Duke]," Tarkanian said. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. The coach revealed his thoughts after the game:
"I didn't want to accept [the trophy]," Tarkanian said. "I wanted my athletic director
to accept it. But they said I had to accept it. it's not a big thing with me. It means a
lot to the great fans we have, though. It was great that the kids could play so well in a
game of this magnitude for them."
"Isn't this sweet revenge for you?" a questioner persisted.
"It's not revenge, but it is sweet," Tarkanian said. "I never felt I'd ever win a
national championship. I didn't play basketball at a great university. I never coached
at a big-time program. I guess UNLV now is a big-time program. But it wasn't when
I took the job. I'm just fortunate that I was able to get one, that's all."
Id.
400. Id.
401. On July 20, 1990, the NCAA declared UNLV ineligible for postseason play in 1991.
Myslenski, NCAA Nails Tarkanian, UNLV, Chicago Tribune, July 21, 1990, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
Recently, the NCAA agreed to reconsider the ban, which prompted UNLV and Tarkanian to
offer alternative penalties. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 29, 1990, § 3, at 3, col. 1. Under one alternative,
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"[Iln the world of intercollegiate athletics, there is but one well-kept playing
field open to colleges and universities, private or public, and the NCAA is
the groundkeeper" as well as the timekeeper and referee.4"0
Tarkanian offered to sit out the 1991 tournament and forgo his personal stake in playoff revenues,
if only his Runnin' Rebels are allowed to defend their title. Id.
On November 29, 1990, the NCAA made the unprecedented move of reversing itself, agreeing
to let UNLV defend its national title in 199l. Myslenski, UNLV Wins 1-Year Reprieve, Chicago
Tribune, Nov. 30, 1990, § 4, at 1, col. 1. Instead, the Runnin' Rebels will sit out the 1992 NCAA
tournament. Id. "It took him 13 years, but Nevada-Las Vegas basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian
finally won one from the NCAA." Id.
402. McKenna, Age Limitations and the National Collegiate Athletic Association: Discrimina-
tion or Equating Competition?, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 379, 407 (1987) (quoting Greene, The New
NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or Racism, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 101, 127 (1984)).
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